The goal of this paper is to strengthen Rafael Bello’s argument from the metaphysics of the hypostatic union against Karl Barth’s fallen Christ. Bello’s book, Sinless Flesh: A Critique of Karl Barth’s Fallen Christ, is situated within a broader movement of contemporary scholarship that considers whether Christ assumed a fallen human nature. In Sinless Flesh, Bello wages a critique against Barth’s affirmation that Christ assumed a fallen human nature (fallen Christ) through an interpretation of Thomistic metaphysics at work within the hypostatic union, specifically the interconnection of the grace of union and habitual grace. While Bello is right to critique Barth’s fallen Christ from this perspective, his argument unfortunately fails. In this paper, I argue that Bello’s argument against Barth fails for various interpretive, theological, and metaphysical reasons. Then, I offer a revised way of arguing against Barth’s view from the same Thomistic metaphysical principles.
To begin, I offer a brief summary of the pertinent aspects of Barth’s theology, paying particular attention to 1) how his theology produces his fallen Christ and 2) the effects of his fallen Christ on Christ’s sanctification. In short, Barth’s use of election as a distributive doctrine requires a shift from a substantive to an actualist ontology—act does not follow being but is being. Further, Barth’s actualist ontology is directly related to his denial of habitual grace in Christ because any form of created in grace in Christ would result in a mixture of his divine and human natures.
Bello identifies correctly that a successful critique of Barth’s denial of Christ’s habitual grace paves the way for a critique of Barth’s fallen Christ. Bello argues that Barth’s fallen Christ dismisses any security of Christ’s antecedent sinlessness. Instead, Christ’s sinlessness is dependent upon his faithful obedience throughout his life. As a result, Barth’s fallen Christ cannot uphold the significance of the grace of union, and the corresponding reception of habitual grace, for Christ’s sanctification at the beginning of his life. While Bello has the right pieces in place, his argument contains several weaknesses.
Bello’s argument contains interpretive weaknesses because he does not attend to the consequences of Barth’s actualist ontology on Christ’s denial of habitual grace adequately. As a result, he leaves too much room for Barth(ians) to reinterpret Bello’s critique within an actualist metaphysic. Bello’s argument contains theological weaknesses because he overcorrects Barth’s position, placing too much weight on the grace of union to the detriment of Christ’s habitual grace. Stemming from the theological weakness, Bello’s argument contains metaphysical weaknesses because his argument does not possess the metaphysical weight to affirm, with Aquinas, Christ’s full reception of habitual grace from conception. Affirming Christ’s full reception of habitual grace from conception provides a pathway to critique Christ’s delayed acquisition of sinlessness present in Barth’s account in ways Bello’s argument is unable to do. Attending to these weaknesses, I affirm the necessity of Christ’s habitual grace in a way that 1) Barth cannot refashion within his actualist ontology and 2) succeeds in denying Barth’s fallen Christ.