

I WRITE 'THESE THINGS NOT TO SHAME YOU

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Abstract: Paul's denial that he intends to shame his readers in 1 Cor 4:14 is puzzling. The catalog of afflictions in 4:8–13, with its sarcasm, appears designed to shame. Moreover, Paul explicitly writes in two other places (6:5; 15:34) that he intends to shame them. Through an exegetical investigation of 4:14 within the larger context of 1 Corinthians 1–4 and a comparison of Paul's rhetoric of shame with other Greco-Roman moralists, this article argues that Paul does intend to shame his readers in 4:14. More importantly, 4:14 functions as the paradigm for understanding Paul's rhetoric of shame in 1 Corinthians, a rhetoric in which Paul uses shame as a pedagogical tool for transforming the minds of his readers into the mind of Christ.

Key Words: Paul, 1 Corinthians, shame, mind of Christ, moral formation, ethics

Paul's rhetoric of shame in 1 Corinthians is puzzling. In 4:14, Paul claims that he is not writing to shame the Corinthians (οὐκ ἐντρέπων ὑμᾶς γράφω ταῦτα). Yet, in two other places (6:5 and 15:34), Paul explicitly states that he intends to shame them (πρὸς ἐντροπὴν ὑμῖν λέγω). One can explain the differences by various complex partition theories.¹ If we accept 1 Corinthians as a unified letter, we might explain the tension by arguing that Paul composed the letter in stages as he reacted to reports about the Corinthian community,² or that the different subject matter in these verses required different measures of response. All these solutions affirm a marked contrast between the rhetoric of 4:14 vis-à-vis 6:5 and 15:34. Against these readings, I argue that Paul does intend to shame his readers in 4:14 despite his apparent denial to the contrary. Moreover, I affirm that 4:14 is the paradigmatic lens with which to understand Paul's rhetoric of shame such as that found in 6:5 and 15:34. My thesis is that Paul uses shame as a pedagogical tool to transform the mind of his readers into the mind of Christ. I defend my thesis in two steps. First, I exegete 4:14 within the larger context of 1 Corinthians 1–4, showing this verse to be paradigmatic for understanding Paul's rhetoric of shame. Second, I provide a sketch of Paul's rhetoric of shame and sharpen this portrayal with a brief comparison to other Greco-Roman moralists.

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¹ For example, we may follow Walter Schmithals, "Die Korintherbriefe als Briefsammlung," *ZNW* 64 (1973): 263–88, consigning 6:5 and 15:34 to Letter B ("the previous letter") and 4:14 to Letter D.

² Martinus C. de Boer, "The Composition of 1 Corinthians," *NTS* 40 (1994): 230–31, argues that 1 Corinthians 1–4 was written in response to reports from Chloe's people, while 1 Corinthians 5–16 was added after the arrival of Stephanas.

I. EXEGESIS OF 1 CORINTHIANS 4:14

Paul in 4:14 states, “I write these things not with the intent to shame you” (οὐκ ἐντρέπων ὑμᾶς γράφω ταῦτα). “These things” (ταῦτα) refer primarily to the immediately preceding verses (4:6–13), but secondarily to Paul’s entire rebuttal of the Corinthians’ infighting beginning from 1:10.³ There are two main reasons for this. First, since 4:14–21 concludes 1 Corinthians 1–4,⁴ ταῦτα probably also refers to arguments made in these chapters. Second, although shaming language is strongest in 4:8–13, it is also present in the earlier chapters. In 1:13–14, Paul rebukes their factionalism; in 3:1–4, he questions their status as “spiritual people” and considers them “infants in Christ” who can only feed on milk; and in 3:18, he warns them not to deceive themselves but to become “fools.” The ἐντρέπων participle (“to shame”) in 4:14 is therefore relevant not only for 4:6–13 but for his entire rebuke in 1 Corinthians 1–4.

At first blush, Paul’s demurral is surprising since the catalog of afflictions in 4:8–13, with its dripping irony and sarcasm,⁵ appears designed to shame his readers. Moreover, the very fact that Paul needs to make an explicit denial is evidence that he believes his response would shame them. The argument that Paul’s denial indicates his reluctance to “demolish their self-respect” or “crush them with self-recrimination” is not fully satisfactory by itself.⁶ After all, Paul is clearly not shy to shame them. In 6:5 and 15:34, he explicitly shames them using the nominal form (ἐντροπή) of the same verb in 4:14 (ἐντρέπω). In other passages, he implicitly shames them (5:2; 11:17, 22). If Paul is not afraid to shame his readers in subsequent chapters, why is he reluctant to do so in 4:14? Commentators typically explain Paul’s reluctance on the grounds that the matter at hand limits his ability or does not justify the use of harsh rhetoric. Thus, C. K. Barrett writes that Paul can speak more freely in 6:5 “because he is not personally involved (as an injured and neglected apostle).”⁷ Joseph Fitzmyer notes that against the conciliatory tone of 4:14, Paul uses a harsher rhetoric in 15:34 because the issues there relate to “a fundamental knowledge of God and his power.”⁸ In other words, Paul is unwilling to shame his readers in 4:14 because he does not want to alienate them as he defends his apostolicity (so Barrett) or because the issue is not as theologically critical as in 1 Corinthians 15 (so Fitzmyer). But if ταῦτα in 4:14 refers to Paul’s broader argument in 1 Corinthians 1–4, with its passionate defense of the central theme of the entire letter—the significance of the cross—then Barrett’s and Fitzmyer’s explanations are less convincing, necessitating another look at 4:14.

My exegesis unfolds in four parts: (1) A contextual and lexical examination of Paul’s shame language in 4:14 suggests that Paul distinguishes between a rhetoric of

³ Benjamin Fiore, “Covert Allusion’ in 1 Corinthians 1–4,” *CBQ* 47 (1985): 97–98.

⁴ The presence of παρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς in 1:10 and 4:16 functions as an inclusio for 1:10–4:21.

⁵ See Karl A. Plank, *Paul and the Irony of Affliction* (Semeia Studies; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987).

⁶ Contra Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 369.

⁷ C. K. Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (BNTC; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 137.

⁸ Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians* (AB 32; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 584.

shame that destroys and a rhetoric that builds. (2) The οὐ ... ἀλλά construction of 4:14 does not mean that “shame” and “admonition” are polar opposites. Rather, Paul advocates the use of shame as a pedagogical tool for admonition. (3) The goal of Paul’s admonition is the transformation of the Corinthians’ mind into the mind of Christ. (4) First Corinthians 4:14 functions as the paradigm for understanding Paul’s rhetoric of shame.

1. *Two uses of shame.* Paul’s shame language in 4:14 must be understood contextually and lexically. In doing so, I propose that Paul differentiates between two uses of shame: a rhetoric of shame that tears down and a rhetoric that builds up. Specifically, there is a rhetoric of shame that the wandering sophists employ and which Paul repudiates. Nevertheless, there is also a rhetoric of shame that a loving father might employ to instruct his children; this is the rhetoric that Paul employs. This proposal will be borne out by a contextual reading of 4:14 and supported by a brief lexical analysis of Paul’s shame vocabulary.

Stephen Pogoloff notes that the rhetorical situation which Paul confronts in 1 Corinthians 1–4 was a community shaped by the social norms of the visiting sophists.⁹ Imitating the sophists’ passion for ambition (φιλοτιμία),¹⁰ the Corinthians prized competitive rhetoric which focused not only on self-praise but the abuse and dishonor of one’s competitor.¹¹ Dio Chrysostom reports that during the Isthmian Games, one could hear at the Isthmus of Corinth “crowds of wretched sophists around Poseidon’s temple shouting and reviling one another, and their disciples ... fighting with one another.”¹² Moreover, the Corinthians with their penchant for litigation (6:1–11) would surely be familiar with the use of invectives and emotional ploys to decimate the reputation and character of one’s opponents.¹³ Seen within

⁹ Stephen M. Pogoloff, *Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians* (SBLDS 134; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992).

¹⁰ Thomas A. Schmitz, “The Second Sophistic,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World* (ed. Michael Peachin; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 309, writes, “One-upmanship was a standard attribute of sophists, and exposing a rival as ignorant or putting an attacker to shame with a witty and devastating retort was part of a sophist’s job.” On sophistic competitiveness, see Tim Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 37–40; Thomas Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht: Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit* (München: C. H. Beck, 1997), 97–135.

¹¹ Philostratus characterizes the sophists by their quarrelsome spirit, noting that “when people called Favorinus a sophist, the mere fact that he had quarreled with a sophist was evidence enough.” Philostratus does not censure the sophists for their spirit of rivalry, “since human nature holds that the love of glory (τὸ φιλότιμον) never grows old.” Rather, he rebukes them for their vitriolic language, remarking that their speeches were so filled with abuse and invectives that “even if it be true, that does not acquit of disgrace even the man who speaks about such things” (*Vit. soph.* 491). On the professional quarrels of the sophists, see G. W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), 89–100; Graham Anderson, *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (London: Routledge, 1993), 35–39.

¹² Or. 8.9.

¹³ J. M. Kelly, *Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 98–99, writes, “What the Romans called *reprehensio vitae* or *vituperatio*—a personal attack on the character of one’s opponents—was taken as absolutely normal; and the manuals of rhetoric dealt in great detail with the most effective ways to construct a *vituperation*. ... [This] was the rule also in ordinary civil cases.” The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* suggest that it is appropriate at the beginning of a speech to stir up “hatred, un-

this zero-sum framework where one won at the expense of others, Paul's defense of his apostleship and rebuke of the Corinthians could be perceived as an invective that attempts to ridicule and humiliate them. Paul's denial in 4:14 should be understood as a refusal to adopt the combative rhetoric of the sophists. He does not intend to use the rhetoric of shame the same way the sophists did, that is, to destroy and humiliate. But is there something more to his understanding of the rhetoric of shame? I think there is.

Paul's attitude towards the rhetoric of shame is consonant with his attitude towards rhetoric in general. In 1 Corinthians 1–4, Paul both opposes *and* uses rhetoric. Paul's statement that his preaching was "not with eloquent wisdom" (1:17), "not in lofty words or wisdom" (2:1), and "not in plausible words of wisdom" (2:4) should not be construed to mean that Paul was a bumbling orator, that his preaching lacked persuasion, or that he did not adopt a communicative strategy. Rather, Michael Bullmore rightly argues that "it [is] against a particular strain of Greco-Roman rhetoric that Paul [sets] forth his own statement of rhetorical style."¹⁴ Paul disowns the bombastic rhetoric and stylistic virtuosity that elevated the orator at the expense of the message. He instead adopts an unadorned style which draws no attention to itself, but which serves to highlight the message of the cross. In a similar manner, Paul both opposes *and* uses the rhetoric of shame. Just as he repudiates sophistic practices in 1 Corinthians 1–4,¹⁵ so also he rejects the sophistic rhetoric of shame. Nevertheless, just as Paul did not completely disavow rhetoric, so also he did not completely disavow a rhetoric of shame if it is used to promote the message of the cross.

Apart from this contextual evidence, there is also lexical evidence that Paul distinguishes between two rhetorics of shame: a rhetoric that exalts oneself at the expense of others and a rhetoric that challenges the other to see the error of their ways in light of the message of the cross. The verb generally rendered as "to shame" in 4:14 is ἐντρέπω. This verb and its nominal form ἐντροπή is not common in Paul's extant literature (ἐντρέπω 3x; ἐντροπή 2x).¹⁶ His favorite is the αἰσχ- word group (αἰσχρός 4x; αἰσχρότης 1x; αἰσχρολογία 1x; ἀνεπαίσχυντος 1x; αἰσχύνω 2x; αἰσχύνη 2x; ἐπαισχύνομαι 5x; and κατααἰσχύνω 10x). Richard Trench remarks that ἐντρέπω differs from the αἰσχύνω word group in that the former "conveys at least a hint of that change of conduct, that return of a man upon himself, which a whole-

popularity, or contempt [on our adversaries] ... by adducing some base, high-handed, treacherous, cruel, impudent, malicious, or shameful act of theirs" (1:8). Cicero is well known for his verbal attacks on individuals. For his use of invectives in both political and legal contexts, see Joan Booth, ed., *Cicero on the Attack: Invective and Subversion in the Orations and Beyond* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2007).

¹⁴ Michael A. Bullmore, *St. Paul's Theology of Rhetorical Style: An Examination of I Corinthians 2.1–5 in Light of First Century Graeco-Roman Rhetorical Culture* (San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1995), 224.

¹⁵ See Bruce W. Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).

¹⁶ The statistics in this section are based on the entire Pauline corpus of 13 letters. Even if one considers the Pastorals to be inauthentic, they are nonetheless Pauline in character.

some shame brings with it in him who is its subject.”¹⁷ This sense may arise from the word’s etymology (*τρέπω* means “to turn”), but it is doubtful if this sense is inherent in the word since *ἐντρέπω* and *αἰσχύνω* word groups are used interchangeably in the LXX.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Paul’s usage of *ἐντρέπω/ἐντροπή* suggests that he might attribute to them the positive valence that Trench commends. Whenever Paul explicitly shames an individual or calls upon the church to shame an individual as part of a disciplinary measure, he uses the *ἐντρέπω* rather than the *αἰσχύνω* word group. Thus, in 1 Cor 6:5 and 15:34, Paul writes, “I say this to your shame (*ἐντροπή*).” In 2 Thess 3:14, Paul exhorts the Thessalonians not to associate with idlers and busybodies who dismiss his warnings so that they may be ashamed (*ἐντρέπω*). Similarly, in Titus 2:8, Paul encourages Titus to show integrity, gravity, and sound speech so that those who oppose him may be ashamed (*ἐντρέπω*). In no instance does Paul use the *αἰσχύνω* word group when he shames, or calls upon the church to shame, others.

When Paul however describes the negative actions of his readers in shaming others, he uses *καταισχύνω*. Thus, “Any man who prays or prophesies with something on his head shames (*καταισχύνω*) his head, but any woman who prays or prophesies with her head unveiled shames (*καταισχύνω*) her head” (1 Cor 11:4–5). If the Corinthians do not give generously, both Paul and they will be shamed (*καταισχύνω*) when the Macedonians come and find that the collection is not ready (2 Cor 9:4). The classic example is 1 Cor 11:22 where Paul castigates the Corinthians for shaming (*καταισχύνω*) those who have nothing. The sample size is admittedly small; nevertheless, these examples suggest that it is Paul’s idiolect that the *ἐντρέπω* word group connotes a constructive and positive role for shame.¹⁹

Let me summarize the arguments so far. A contextual reading of 1 Corinthians 1–4 and the lexical survey of Paul’s shame language validate our proposal that Paul differentiates between two uses of shame. The contextual reading shows that Paul’s rhetoric of shame should be understood within his overall assessment of sophistic rhetoric. In general, Paul both opposes and uses the rhetoric of shame. Paul’s intention is not to shame the Corinthians in the manner of the sophists but to shame them in a positive manner for their good. At the same time, our lexical survey shows that Paul attaches a positive valence to *ἐντρέπω*. Paul’s use of *ἐντρέπω* rather than *καταισχύνω* then delimits the shame language of 4:14 to be a constructive form of shame. If this is so, how then do we make sense of the negating οὐκ? The clause οὐκ ἐντρέπων ὑμᾶς γράφω ταῦτα (I am writing these things *not to shame you positively*) appears to contradict my understanding of Paul’s rhetoric of shame as Paul seems to repudiate even a positive use of shame. It may be possible

¹⁷ Richard Chenevix Trench, *Synonyms of the New Testament* (9th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1880), 69.

¹⁸ See Pss 34:4, 26; 39:15; 43:16; 68:20; 69:3; 70:24; 108:29; Isa 41:11; 44:11; 45:16–17 (LXX).

¹⁹ See also Moisés Silva, “*αἰσχύνω, κτλ.*,” *NIDNTE* 1:185, who notes, “It does seem likely ... that the expression *πρὸς ἐντροπήν ὑμῖν* (“[I say this] to your shame”) in 1 Cor 6:5 and 15:34 was deliberately chosen by Paul because *πρὸς αἰσχύνην* would have had a more negative connotation (“to dishonor/d disgrace you”; cf. Plut. *Per.* 33.7); the apostle of course did not wish to insult the Corinthians but rather hoped that they would alter their behavior.”

to explain this οὐκ clause as an example of irony and sarcasm: Paul intends to shame his readers, even though he formally denies it. But the following ἀλλά clause discounts this possibility. There is a better answer; and for this, we need to examine the οὐ ... ἀλλά construction in 4:14.

1. *The οὐ ... ἀλλά construction: shame as a pedagogical tool.* In 4:14, Paul states, “I write these things not with the intent to shame you, but with the intent to instruct you as my beloved children” (οὐκ ἐντρέπων ὑμᾶς γράφω ταῦτα ἀλλ’ ὡς τέκνα μου ἀγαπητὰ νουθετῶν). The two present participles, ἐντρέπων and νουθετῶν, stand in parallel and probably indicate the purpose of γράφω although future participles are more suited for this function. The οὐ ... ἀλλά construction here does not mean that ἐντρέπων and νουθετῶν are polar opposites. While the construction frequently presents the ἀλλά phrase as contrary to the preceding οὐ, “οὐ ... ἀλλά also means ‘not so much ... as’ in which the first element is not entirely negated, but only toned down.”²⁰ The ἀλλά phrase is clearly emphasized but not at the expense of the οὐ, especially when the first element supports the second. In 4:14, the οὐ ... ἀλλά construction clearly highlights the importance of νουθετῶν vis-à-vis ἐντρέπων. This, however, does not mean that ἐντρέπων is completely negated; it is only made subservient to νουθετῶν. In other words, Paul repudiates any ἐντρέπων that does not undergird the task of νουθετῶν, but supports any that does.

This use of the οὐ ... ἀλλά construction is already seen earlier in 1:17 (οὐ γὰρ ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστὸς βαπτίζειν ἀλλ’ εὐαγγελίζεσθαι). This verse has a similar οὐ ... ἀλλά construction with two parallel purpose phrases (using infinitives rather than participles) that modify a finite verb. Helmut Merklein cautions that the phrase “Christ did not send me to baptize” must be understood within the context of 1:14–16,²¹ a context in which the fractious Corinthians focused not on the baptism per se but on the minister who performed the baptism. Consequently, baptisms no longer proclaim the gospel (as it does in Rom 6:3–11) but trumpets the status of the one who is baptized, thereby exacerbating the divisive spirit within the community. It is within such a context that Paul remarks, “Christ did not (οὐ) send me to baptize but (ἀλλά) to proclaim the gospel” (1:17). The οὐ ... ἀλλά construction here should not lead us to suppose that there is a stark contrast between baptismal and preaching ministry, or that baptism is denigrated. Paul, after all, inseparably binds the offer of baptism with the message of the cross in 1:13.²² Rather, 1:17 means that *part* of Paul’s apostolic commission includes baptizing his converts;

²⁰ BDF §448(1). BDF gives the following examples: Mark 9:37 (ὅς ἂν ἐμὲ δέχεται, οὐκ ἐμὲ δέχεται ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με); Matt 10:20 (οὐ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ λαλοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν); John 12:44 (ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ πιστεύει εἰς ἐμὲ ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸν πέμψαντά με); Acts 5:4 (οὐκ ἐψεύσω ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ). In logical categories, the οὐ here is an internal (negation of some component or aspect of the proposition) rather than an external negation (negation of the proposition in total). In the former, the οὐ needs to be understood contextually. Catherine Atherton, *The Stoics on Ambiguity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 79, notes that first-century Stoics were aware of the distinction between internal and external negation.

²¹ Helmut Merklein, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther* (ÖTK 7; Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 1992), 1:165.

²² Adolf von Schlatter, *Paulus, der Bote Jesu: Eine Deutung seiner Briefe an die Korinther* (4th ed.; Stuttgart: Calwer, 1969), 74.

nevertheless, this baptismal ministry must serve the higher goal of gospel proclamation. In a similar manner, 4:14 indicates that *part* of Paul's writing these things is to shame his readers; *nevertheless*, that shaming rhetoric must serve the higher goal of admonition.

The line between rebuke and ridicule is thin. Those who are shamed can easily misinterpret the blunt frankness of genuine friends.²³ Consequently, Paul needs to clarify the intent of his shaming rhetoric lest he be misconstrued as intending to humiliate his readers. This is especially important given the rhetorical situation of 1 Corinthians 1–4. In these chapters, Paul responds to reports of internal divisions within the Corinthian church (1:10–11) and tensions between him and the church (4:3, 18–19). Faced with these challenges, Paul's response needs an apologetic and pastoral task. Apologetically, Paul must respond to the criticism if he is to remain their apostle and be able to judge their behavior. Pastorally, Paul must also respond to their profound misunderstanding about the nature of the gospel. These twin tasks require Paul to clarify that the rhetoric and irony that he uses are ultimately for their good, for building them up and not tearing down (cf. 2 Cor 10:8; 13:10).²⁴ If Paul does not clarify his intention, his rhetoric of shame may accomplish the apologetic but not the pastoral task, for the Corinthians would assume that he is shaming them out of personal grievances.²⁵ If Paul does not clarify his intention, his rhetoric of shame would only censure, not admonish.²⁶

This positive role that shame plays in instruction or admonition is also confirmed in 2 Thessalonians, a letter that was written within a few years of 1 Corinthians and that was written in Corinth. The lexical and conceptual links between 2 Thess 3:14–15 and 1 Cor 4:14 are especially pertinent. Both ἐντρέπω and νοουθετέω are found in these two passages. Moreover, 2 Thess 3:14 deals with the issue of expulsion (μη συναναμίγνυσθαι αὐτῶ), a topic that is found immediately after 1 Cor 4:14 in 5:1–13. The link between 2 Thessalonians 3 and 1 Corinthians 5 is highlighted when we remember that the verb συναμίγνυμι occurs nowhere else in the

²³ Plutarch remarks how easy it is for some to misinterpret well-intentioned rebuke. When “these same people are guilty of mistakes and blunders, the man who by chiding and blaming implants the sting of repentance (μετάνοια) is taken to be an enemy and an accuser. Whereas they welcome the man who praises and extols what they have done and regard him as kind and friendly” (*Mor.* 56A–B). See also Cicero, *Amic.* 24.89.

²⁴ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.17–19, 26, contrasts a punishing harshness that destroys and a severity of speech that is by nature salutary.

²⁵ Plutarch is well aware that frank speech may be misinterpreted as capricious fault-finding rather than admonition. He writes, “Seeing, therefore, that there are certain fatal faults attending upon frankness, let us in the first place divest it of all self-regard by exercising all vigilance lest we seem to have some private reason for our reproaches, such as a personal wrong or grievance. For people are wont to think that anger, not goodwill, is the motive of a man who speaks on his own behalf, and that this is not admonition but fault-finding (οὔτε νοουθεσίαν ἀλλὰ μέμψιν εἶναι). For frankness is friendly and noble, but fault-finding is selfish and mean. For this reason those who speak frankly are respected and admired, while fault-finders meet with recrimination and contempt” (*Adul. amic.* 66E).

²⁶ *Gnomologium Byzantium* 59: “Admonition (τὸ νοουθετεῖν) differs greatly from insults (τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν). For the former is gentle and friendly, while the latter is harsh and insolent (ὄβριστικόν). The former corrects those who sin (τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας), but the latter merely censures (ἐλέγχει)” (Curt Wachsmuth, *Studien zu den griechischen Florilegien* [Berlin: Weidmann, 1882], 176).

NT except in these two passages (2 Thess 3:14; 1 Cor 5:9, 11). In 2 Thess 3:14–15, Paul directs the church to expel refractory members of the community so that they might be ashamed (*ἵνα ἐντραπή*). Nevertheless, the community is not to regard such members as enemies, but to instruct or admonish them as believers (*νουθετεῖτε ὡς ἀδελφόν*). Both 2 Thessalonians 3 and 1 Corinthians 4 call for a rhetoric of shame, but a rhetoric that serves as a pedagogical tool to *νουθετέω*. The difference between the two passages is the manner of admonition: *ὡς ἀδελφόν* in 2 Thessalonians 3 and *ὡς τέκνα μου ἀγαπητά* in 1 Corinthians 4.

2. *Appropriating the mind of Christ.* If we are correct that the rhetoric of shame serves as a pedagogical tool for *νουθετέω*, what is the goal of this admonition? The verb *νουθετέω* derives from *νοῦν τίθημι*, that is, “to impart a mind or understanding” or “to put in the right mind.” The reference to mind or *νοῦς* is illuminating since the word has appeared before in 1 Corinthians.

The first occurrence is in 1:10 where Paul rebukes the Corinthians for their *σχίσματα* and *ἔριδες* (1:10–11) and exhorts them to be in agreement, that *ἦτε κατηρτισμένοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῖ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ* (1:10).²⁷ The divisions within the community reflect their lack of a common mind (*ὁμόνοια*) within the body of Christ with the result that Christ is divided (1:13). The fragmented minds of the Corinthians are to be replaced by a common mind, the singular mind of Christ. This notion is already hinted at in 1:9 where Paul remarks that they were called into fellowship with Christ (1:9; cf. also 10:15–16). Paul’s use of fellowship (*κοινωνία*) language evokes the Greco-Roman understanding of friendship (*φιλία*),²⁸ a concept where friends hold all things in common (*κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*).²⁹ Friendship is life together, and the unity between friends is so intimate that a friend is considered another self (*ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός*).³⁰ Friends are of one soul and heart (*μία ψυχὴ καὶ καρδιά*).³¹ Friends share the same mind (*ὁ αὐτὸς νοῦς*) and the same frame of reference (*ἢ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ*).³² Thus, if the Corinthian believers have been called into fellowship with Christ, they must exhibit the same mind and same frame of reference as Christ. That is, they must adopt the cruciform mind of Christ.

The second explicit mention of *νοῦς* is in 2:16. This verse confirms that “the same mind” (*ὁ αὐτὸς νοῦς*) the Corinthians are to adopt in 1:10 is the mind of Christ. Paul remarks that the presence of the Holy Spirit mediates the presence of the risen Christ and the mind of Christ (*νοῦς Χριστοῦ*) among the community. In 2:12, Paul notes the origin of the Spirit which the Corinthian believers possess:

²⁷ Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 1, considers 1:10 to be the thesis statement of the entire argument of 1 Corinthians.

²⁸ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 8.12.1 (1161B): “All friendship (*φιλία*) ... involves community (*κοινωνία*).”

²⁹ Iamblichus, *De Vita Pythagorica* 19; ET John M. Dillon and Jackson P. Hershbell, *Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Way of Life* (SBLTT 29; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 117.

³⁰ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 9.4.5 (1166A).

³¹ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 9.8.2 (1168B).

³² According to Cicero, “There is no surer bond of friendship than the sympathetic union of thought and inclination” (*Planc.* 5). “The whole essence of friendship” is in “the most complete agreement in policy, in pursuits, and in opinion” (*Amic.* 4.15).

“We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God (τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ).” Those without the Spirit, the ψυχικοί, are not able to know the things of God, since no one has known the mind of the Lord (νοῦν κυρίου) so as to instruct him (2:16). But in contrast to the ψυχικοί, the Corinthian believers are able to know the things of God because they have been revealed by the Spirit.³³ Paul emphatically states: “But we have the mind of Christ (νοῦν Χριστοῦ).” Jewett remarks,

The verse (2:16) expresses the claim that the gospel of the cross is the content of God’s plan and thus the key to his mind, and that this mind was received by Paul and the Christian community. It establishes that there is one normative mind for the Christian community—the mind of Christ. This relates back to the first reference to “mind” in ... 1 Cor 1:10 ... where the Corinthians are exhorted to be perfected in the same mind. There can be little doubt that in both cases ... the ὁ αὐτὸς νοῦς in 1 Cor 1:10 is defined as the νοῦς Χριστοῦ in 1 Cor 2:16.³⁴

The word νοῦς does not just denote the ability of thought; it is the “constellation of thoughts and assumptions which makes up the consciousness of the person and acts as the agent of rational discernment and communication.”³⁵ It is the mode of thought, framework, belief structure, and moral consciousness which provides the criteria for judgment and actions. But in a surprising twist, the mind that the Spirit mediates is not the “mind of the Lord” but the “mind of Christ.” It is the mind of Christ who gives insight into the mind of God. Moreover, since all major references to Christ so far in the letter have been that of a crucified Christ (1:17, 23–24, 30; 2:2), the “mind of Christ” that the Spirit inculcates in the community is the cruciform pattern of Christ. The mind of Christ does not center on special knowledge, mystical thoughts, or ecstatic experiences. Rather, it focuses on displaying the lifestyle of a crucified Messiah within the life of the community. It calls for giving up one’s rights, putting to death one’s selfish ambitions, humbling oneself, and serving others so that the body may be built up. It is a life characterized by self-giving love where power is mediated through weakness; it is a life transformed by the cross.

The next occurrence of a νοῦς-related word is νουθετέω in 4:14. The word is used here “to depict the pedagogical task of putting persons in the right mind,”³⁶ and there is little doubt that the right mind which the Corinthians are to adopt is the mind of Christ mentioned in 2:16. After developing a robust theology of the cross that is centered on the cruciform mind of Christ, Paul concludes 1 Corinthians 1–4 by reminding them that he has written all these things to νουθετεῖν them, to put them in the right mind of Christ. The νοῦς Χριστοῦ is available to the commu-

³³ The role of the Holy Spirit in mediating the mind of the Lord is strengthened since the Hebrew underlying Paul’s use of νοῦν κυρίου from Isa 40:13 (LXX) is הַיְהוָה הַיְהוָה.

³⁴ Robert Jewett, *Paul’s Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings* (AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971), 377–78.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 450.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 380.

nity by the Holy Spirit; nevertheless, the Corinthians must cultivate and adopt the cruciform pattern of Christ in their communal lives, in their interactions with one another. As a loving father, Paul helps the Corinthians in this process by admonishing (νουθετῶν) them.

Paul's rhetoric of shame plays a fundamental role in his admonition and transformation of their minds into the mind of Christ. The situation of the Corinthians has become so deplorable that Paul's language cannot just provide information. Rather, it must challenge them at a personal level. It is in this regard that the verb νουθετέω differs from διδάσκω. The latter's "primary effect is on the intellect"; the former "describes an effect on the will and disposition, and it presupposes an opposition which has to be overcome."³⁷ Instead of plain speech, Paul uses the forceful language of shame to compel his reader not to read the text as bland information.³⁸ Rather, they are to sit up and take notice as his words pierce their hearts. Given their narcissistic tendencies and selfish ambitions, it was not enough for them to know that they have done wrong; they needed to be shaken from their complacency.³⁹

3. *1 Cor 4:14 as a paradigm.* At this point, we are now ready to reexamine the relationship between 4:14 (οὐκ ἐντρέπων ὑμᾶς γράφω ταῦτα ἀλλ' ὡς τέκνα μου ἀγαπητὰ νουθετῶν) and 6:5; 15:34 (πρὸς ἐντροπήν ὑμῖν λέγω). If my analysis is correct, the difference between these verses is only formal, not substantive. On the contrary, I would argue that 4:14 serves as the paradigm for understanding Paul's rhetoric of shame, including its use in 6:5 and 15:34. My reasons are as follows.

First, there is no substantive tension between 4:14 and 6:5; 15:34. For in all three passages, Paul advocates the use of shame, properly understood.

Second, the first occurrence of the ἐντρέπω/ἐντροπή word group and the first explicit mention of Paul shaming anyone occurs in 4:14. As such, Paul must first clarify here the function of his rhetoric of shame lest it be misunderstood by the Corinthians. Once he has explained that his shaming rhetoric is not meant to destroy but to build up and admonish, he can then use it without further clarification in 6:5 and 15:34. In this way, 4:14 functions as the paradigm for understanding Paul's subsequent uses of shame.

Third, it is generally recognized that 1:10–4:21 functions as the *locus classicus* for Paul's theology of the cross. But the purpose of 1:10–4:21 is not to provide a theological reflection of the crucifixion, "but to reassert Paul's authority as the founder and spiritual father of the *entire* church at Corinth ... ; while at the same time preparing for the answers to be given to the Corinthians' questions in the rest of the letter by indicating the *theological criterion* which determines both the nature of

³⁷ Johannes Behm, "νουθετέω, νουθεσία," TDNT 4:1019.

³⁸ See Plank, *Paul and the Irony of Affliction*, 71–73, for a brief discussion on the differences between plain speech and forceful language.

³⁹ Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.8: "Emotional appeals are necessary if truth, justice, and the common good cannot be secured by other means." See also Martha C. Nussbaum, *Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 211, where she examines the quotation "Guilt doesn't go anywhere near far enough; the appropriate emotion is shame" from Barbara Ehrenreich's book *Nickel and Dimed*.

Paul's apostleship ... and his evaluation of the church's problems."⁴⁰ Paul's *theologia crucis* in 1 Corinthians 1–4 thus functions as a central theme for the entire letter, for it functions as a prism with which to evaluate not only Paul's own ministry but also the life of the Corinthian church. Now, if Paul's *theologia crucis* is central, 4:14 must also be paradigmatic for the letter. For its placement at the conclusion of 1 Corinthians 1–4 and its explanation that Paul's shaming rhetoric serves to inculcate the cruciform mind indicate how this verse is one practical outworking of Paul's *theologia crucis* in the Corinthians' life.

II. PAUL IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD

In this section, I sketch how Paul's rhetoric of shame might function in 1 Corinthians. I then briefly survey the role of shame in moral formation within the Greco-Roman world and compare that with my portrayal of Paul's rhetoric of shame. This procedure is beneficial as Paul's occasional letters do not present us with a systematic analysis of how he intends his rhetoric of shame to function. A brief examination of these other ancient writings therefore allows these works to serve as intertexture to fill in the gaps that may have been assumed by Paul.

1. *Paul's rhetoric of shame.* Paul does not present us with a systematic treatise detailing the workings of his shaming rhetoric. Given the occasional nature of his letters, we have only as much information as is raised by the situation that Paul addresses. We see him using the rhetoric of shame, not explaining it. Nevertheless, the data suggests that Paul's shaming rhetoric functions in three ways.

a. *Critique to evaluate past actions.* Paul's shaming of the Corinthians forces them to evaluate themselves and their past actions from the gaze of another. The Corinthians were puffed up, one over against another (4:6). The verb *φυσιώω* figures prominently in 1 Corinthians (4:6, 18, 19; 5:2; 8:1; 13:4).⁴¹ Their notions of superiority, sense of entitlement, and arrogant behavior stemmed "from a failure in self-knowledge."⁴² If the Corinthians are to improve morally, they must first see themselves for who they really are since "the knowledge of sin is the beginning of [moral] salvation."⁴³ When Paul shames the Corinthians, he shatters their complacency and puts before them a mirror or frame of reference with which to see themselves.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Scott J. Hafemann, *Suffering and the Spirit: An Exegetical Study of II Cor. 2:14–3:3 within the Context of the Corinthian Correspondence* (WUNT 2/19; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 59 (underline added).

⁴¹ Dio Chrysostom notes that the Corinthians were "foolishly puffed up" (*Or.* 9.21). They "assumed airs and prided [themselves] ... on their wealth or family or some other distinction" (*Or.* 9.8). It appears that the Corinthian church had adopted the mindset of the larger community.

⁴² Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT 2/23; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 205.

⁴³ Seneca, *Ep.* 28.9. See also Johan C. Thom, *The Pythagorean Golden Verses: With Introduction and Commentary* (Religions in the Graeco-Roman World 123; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 163–67, where he examines the call for self-examination found in *Golden Verses* 40–44. He notes that self-examination is the "*sine qua non* for any progress in virtue" (p. 163).

⁴⁴ In this regard, Paul's shaming rhetoric is similar to the shaming elenchus put forward by the Eleatic Stranger (in Plato's *Sophist*) to cast out the conceit of cleverness in ignorant men. He writes, "For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered

Through the painful emotive experience of shame, they are forced to examine themselves and determine if this evaluation from a new frame of reference is justified.⁴⁵ The frame of reference that Paul presents to the Corinthians is the cruciform pattern of Christ. This is seen clearly in 4:6–13 where Paul holds up the apostle’s suffering as an “ironic critique” against their worldly mindset.⁴⁶ In doing so, Paul is not defending his legitimacy as a true philosopher, but presenting the cruciform pattern of Christ as lived out in the apostles. His argument assumes that the apostles model the way of the cross. His shaming rhetoric therefore calls the Corinthians to examine themselves in light of this frame of reference.

b. *Critique to evaluate future actions.* Paul’s shaming rhetoric not only forces the Corinthians to evaluate their *past* actions from the gaze of another, it also encourages them to inculcate a framework with which to evaluate all *future* actions. In several instances, Paul shames the Corinthians with οὐχὶ μᾶλλον rhetorical questions: “Should you not rather have mourned?” (5:2); “Why not rather be wronged? Why not rather be defrauded?” (6:7). The thrust of these rhetorical questions address what they should have done in that present situation—that is, they should have mourned, and they should have let themselves be wronged and defrauded. Nevertheless, they implicitly also set the framework and perspective by which they should respond in the future.

When people who are shamed agree that the rebuke was justified and their actions indeed shameful, they invariably adopt a mindset and disposition to avoid similar shameful actions in the future. In this way, shaming rhetoric shapes the moral disposition and conscience of people, causing them to evaluate whether future actions are shameful or good. If we are correct that Paul’s rhetoric of shame functions to inculcate the mind of Christ in the Corinthians, then it is readily apparent that Paul’s rhetoric shapes the moral disposition and conscience of his readers since the cruciform mind of Christ functions as the theological criterion to evaluate all communal life. For example, Paul writes, “Everyone ought to examine (δοκιμάζω) themselves before they eat of the bread and drink the cup. . . . If we examined ourselves (ἑαυτοὺς διεκρίνομεν), we would not be judged” (11:31). The examination of themselves takes the form of discerning the body (διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα; 11:29), that is, recognizing the significance of the cruciform body of Christ.⁴⁷ As the Corinthians partake of the Lord’s Supper, they proclaim their κοινωνία with

to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned εἰς αἰσχύνην, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more” (Plato, *Soph.* 230C–D).

⁴⁵ In this regard, shame is a self-conscious emotion, an emotion that has as its components “consciousness of the self . . . and evaluation of the self against some standard” (Kurt W. Fischer and June Price Tangney, “Self-Conscious Emotions and the Affect Revolution: Framework and Overview,” in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride* [ed. June Price Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer; New York: Guilford, 1995], 14).

⁴⁶ John T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence* (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 148.

⁴⁷ While σῶμα can refer to the body of believers, the context of vv. 24 and 27 prove decisive. In these verses, σῶμα clearly refers to the crucified body of Christ.

the crucified Lord (10:16), a *κοινωνία* that must result in identity transformation as they share in the mind of Christ. Paul's call for them to examine themselves is then a call to discern how the mind of Christ should function as the theological conscience of the community and the framework by which they are to evaluate their lives.

Seen in the above light, it is important to note that the purpose of Paul's shaming rhetoric is not only to curtail or modify behavioral actions. These are only the tip of the iceberg; what is more fundamental is the deep underlying value structure that gives rise to these actions. By transforming the minds of his readers into the mind of Christ, Paul moves past the superficial task of behavioral modification to value transformation. He works from the inside out, realigning their mode of thought and moral conscience so that their lives eventually display the marks of a crucified Messiah.

c. *Sign of prophetic judgment.* In 1 Corinthians, three entities function as the grammatical subject of shaming verbs in the active sense of "to shame": the Corinthians (*καταισχύνω*), Paul (*ἐντρέπω*), and God (*καταισχύνω*). The instances with Paul and the Corinthians have already been noted above. In 1:27, Paul states that "God chose what is foolish in the world ἵνα καταισχύνῃ the wise; God chose what is weak in the world ἵνα καταισχύνῃ the strong."⁴⁸ Paul's portrayal of God's activity is consonant with the rest of the Bible where God is frequently portrayed as the subject of active *αἰσχύνω* verbs and the shame which he brings is his judgment.⁴⁹

Despite challenges from some within the Corinthian church, Paul was deeply conscious of his apostolic authority. As an apostle of Christ Jesus by the will of God (1:1), as a laborer belonging to God (3:7),⁵⁰ as a servant who has been entrusted with the mysteries of God (4:2), as one deeply aware that all his actions will be judged by the Lord (4:4), as one who communicates the Lord's command (14:37), Paul saw himself as the direct mediator of the gospel as well as its authoritative interpreter. Consequently, his shaming rebuke of the Corinthian community for failing to conduct their lives in line with the gospel carries not only his own apostolic authority but also the authority of God, foreshadowing in a limited way the shaming judgment that God himself would enact. Such an understanding is confirmed in 5:5 where Paul declares, "I have already passed judgment *in the name of our Lord Jesus* on the man who has done such a thing" (5:4).⁵¹ Paul passes a prophetic judgment on the man who was sleeping with his father's wife, but the authority of

⁴⁸ Paul writes that the Corinthians shame (*καταισχύνω*; 11:22) those who have nothing. In using the same verb which he has earlier used to describe God's shaming judgment on the wise and strong, Paul may suggest that the Corinthians are usurping God's prerogative to judge.

⁴⁹ Rudolf Bultmann, "αἰσχύνω, ἐπαισχύνω, κτλ.," *TDNT* 1:189.

⁵⁰ The phrase θεοῦ συνεργοί (3:7) probably means "fellow laborers *belonging* to God" (possessive genitive) rather than "fellow laborers *with* God" (associative genitive).

⁵¹ In 5:3–4, the phrase ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ can modify συναχθέντων ὑμῶν ("when you are gathered in the name of our Lord Jesus") or κατεργασάμενον ("the one who perpetrated this deed in the name of our Lord Jesus"), but it more likely modifies κέκριτα ("I have already passed judgment in the name of the Lord Jesus").

this judgment is not his own—it is that of the risen Lord Jesus.⁵² Moreover, the execution of this judgment is also done “with the power of our Lord Jesus” (5:4).

2. *A glance at the role of shame in Greco-Roman moral education.* In this subsection, I draw a thumbnail sketch of how several Greco-Roman thinkers perceive the role of shame in moral formation. The study of moral emotions in classical authors is an exciting field of study and what is presented here cannot do justice to the complex and intertwining streams of thought. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article, this sketch should function as an adequate context to situate Paul within his world.

The role that shame plays in moral education has a long history in the Greco-Roman world. But it is first necessary to distinguish between prospective and retrospective shame, that is, between a kind of shame that looks to the future and restrains one from performing bad acts and one that is consequent upon having done bad acts.⁵³ Prospective shame, dispositional shame, or “sense of shame” was generally considered a virtue (*ἀρετή*) that could be acquired through education. For example, Plato puts into Protagoras’s mouth a myth of Zeus sending humanity two gifts, justice (*δίκη*) and a sense of shame (*αἰδώς*). These are the skills that allow humanity to live together successfully and that should be taught to all men such that “he who cannot partake of *αἰδώς* and *δίκη* shall die the death as a public pest.”⁵⁴ In their efforts to cultivate these two skills, a child’s nurse, mother, tutor, and father take pains from his earliest childhood to “teach and impress him that this is just, and that unjust, one thing noble, another base (*αἰσχρόν*).”⁵⁵ In the post-mythic section, Protagoras replaces *αἰδώς* with *σωφροσύνη* (self-control, temperance),⁵⁶ thereby showing a basic equivalence between these two ideas and cementing the importance of prospective shame in moral education. The importance of prospective shame for moral education is also seen in the first century Stoic Musonius Rufus. He recommends that both male and female children, straight from infancy, should be taught “that this is right and that is wrong, . . . that this is helpful, that is harm-

⁵² Paul is clearly aware that he can command and make judgments in the authority of the Lord Jesus. His most recent letter, 2 Thessalonians, also attests to this understanding (“We command you *in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ*”; 3:16).

⁵³ There are two Greek words that are typically translated as “shame”—*αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη*. The fourth century bishop Nemesius distinguishes between these two, noting that the one who feel *αἰσχύνη* is shamed for what he has done (*ὁ μὲν αἰσχυνόμενος ἐφ’ οἷς ἔπραξε καταδύεται*), but the one who feels *αἰδώς* fears that he will fall into some disgrace (*ὁ δὲ αἰδούμενος φοβεῖται περιπεσεῖν ἀδοξία τινί*; SVF 3.416.17 = Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man* ch. 20). He adds that the ancients often call *αἰδώς αἰσχύνη*, but remarks that in doing so they misuse the terms. David Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 97, notes that Nemesius is the first to differentiate between *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη* on the distinction of prospective and retrospective shame. He nevertheless asserts that Nemesius is certainly wrong about this distinction in classical Greek because both prospective and retrospective senses of shame coexist in the term *αἰσχύνη*. See also Douglas L. Cairns, *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 415. Plutarch, *Mor.* 529D, notes that the Stoics distinguish between *τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι* and *τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι*. He however does not quibble over the terms. More pertinent to our purposes, *ἐντρέπω* can be used for both retrospective and prospective purposes.

⁵⁴ Plato, *Prot.* 322D.

⁵⁵ Plato, *Prot.* 325D.

⁵⁶ Plato, *Prot.* 323A.

ful... . Then they must be inspired with a feeling of shame (*αἰδῶ*) toward all that is base (*αἰσχρόν*). When these two qualities have been created with them, man and woman are of necessity self-controlled (*σώφρων*).⁵⁷

But “in order to develop a second-order disposition or sense of shame, an individual must first experience the occurrent emotion of being ashamed on at least some previous occasions.”⁵⁸ Greco-Roman moral philosophers felt that there was something salutary in retrospective shame. Thus, they shamed others with the intent of producing the occurrent experience of shame within the individual or collective body, causing them to see themselves as others see them. Aristotle recognizes the value of this appeal to the *pathos* of shame, noting that shaming your audience may motivate them to pursue some good which they ought to have attained but which they have thus far failed to do so.⁵⁹

Examples of such appeals to shame can be easily found. For example, Diogenes Laertius 2.29 reports that just as Socrates made Lysis into a most virtuous character by exhortation (*προτρέπω*), he also did the same with the son Lamprocles, by shaming (*ἐντρέπω*) him when he was angry with his mother. The use of *προτρέπω* and *ἐντρέπω* together in this passage is not unexpected since both are built on the *τρέπω* root. Nevertheless, it does give further evidence that *ἐντρέπω* can be used positively in protrepsis or moral exhortation.

Dio Chrysostom also uses the rhetoric of shame masterfully when he addresses the Rhodian assembly in *Or.* 31.⁶⁰ The Rhodian assembly was in the habit of recognizing its benefactors by erecting statues in their honor. After the city was flooded with statues, the assembly introduced cost-saving and space-saving measures by simply having the name of any new benefactor engraved on an already existing statue, after first chiseling out the name of the previous benefactor. Dio’s strategy here is to shame the Rhodians for dishonoring the memory of their benefactors for the sake of money. He compares the statues to actors who assume different roles at different times—at one time a Greek, later a Roman or Macedonian

⁵⁷ Musonius Rufus, *Should Daughters Receive the Same Education as Sons?* (Stobaeus 2.31.126; ET Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus: “The Roman Socrates,”* [YCS 10; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947], 47–49).

⁵⁸ Christina H. Tarnopolsky, *Prides, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato’s Gorgias and the Politics of Shame* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 104.

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.6.12 (1584A). Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 27, writes, “Given that judgment and belief are central to the dynamics of the emotions as Aristotle conceives them, it is natural that an understanding of the *pathé* should form part of the art of persuasion.” In an appraisal theory of emotions like Aristotle’s, judgments and beliefs are regarded as one of the determinants of emotions. Nevertheless, the reverse direction of influence is also true—emotions can influence our beliefs and judgments. This is readily seen in Aristotle’s definition of emotions: “The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgments” (*Rhet.* 2.1.8 [1378A]). See also *Rhet.* 1.2.5 (1356A): “The judgments we deliver are not the same when we are influenced by joy or sorrow, love or hate.”

⁶⁰ See also *Or.* 48.15–16 where he shames the Bithynians for their disunity. He writes, “Is it not disgraceful (*αἰσχρόν*) that bees are of one mind and no one has ever seen a swarm that is factious and fights against itself, but, on the contrary, they both work and live together? ... Is it not disgraceful (*αἰσχρόν*), then, as I was saying, that human beings should be more unintelligent than wild creatures which are so tiny and unintelligent?” For other examples, see *Or.* 32.

or Persian. He thinks that even the masons will blush for shame when they are instructed to carry out this task. He further shames the Rhodians by reminding them of their recent past where they did not choose a dishonorable course of action (declaring bankruptcy) for the sake of monetary gain even though they were in an economic crisis. Instead, they incurred civic debt in order that there might be no blemish on their honor. Their past nobility stands in stark contrast to their present disgrace, a disgrace made all the more shameful given their present economic prosperity. Throughout the speech, Dio refers to that which is *αἰσχρόν* in order to exhort the Rhodians to change their practices. He incredulously remarks, “Can it be that you are unaware of the shame which attaches to this practice, and how ridiculous you make yourselves by this deception practiced by your state, and that too so openly?” (31.153).

Plutarch also draws the connection between moral progress and the occurrent experience of retrospective shame. He notes that rebukes and admonitions (*νουθεσία*) which seek to reform its hearers must penetrate like a biting drug, cause sweating and dizziness, and “burn with shame (*αἰσχύνη*) in the soul.”⁶¹ He again writes, “Admonition (*νουθεσία*) and rebuke engender repentance and shame (*αἰσχύνη*).”⁶² In order to reform the moral soul of a person, the moral philosopher, like any good physician, must not be afraid to employ harsh medicine.⁶³ And this bitter medicine includes the rhetoric of shame.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, harsh words need to be balanced with gentle ones, and blame must be balanced with praise.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Plutarch, *Mor.* 46D.

⁶² Plutarch, *Mor.* 452C.

⁶³ In *Or.* 77/78, Dio compares the true philosopher to a physician who is eager to do all he can to aid man. He writes, “Take, for example, the physician; if he should find it necessary to treat father or mother or his children when they are ill, . . . , in case he should need to employ surgery or cautery, he would not, because he loves his children and respects his father and his mother, for that reason cut with a duller knife or cauterize with milder fire, but, on the contrary, he would use the most potent and vigorous treatment possible. . . . Therefore toward oneself first of all, and also toward one’s nearest and dearest, one must behave with fullest frankness and independence, showing no reluctance or yielding in one’s words. For far worse than a corrupt and diseased body is a soul which is corrupt, not, I swear, because of salves or potions or some consuming poison, but rather because of ignorance and depravity and insolence, yes, and jealousy and grief and unnumbered desires” (43–45).

⁶⁴ Philodemus, *On Frank Criticism*, also affirms the deliberate use of mental pain in moral formation. In order to change his students’ ethical thinking, he advocates the use of frank criticism (*παρηγορία*) that stings or, literally, “bites” (*δηγμός*) their hearts. He writes, “If . . . he {the student} did not heed the frank criticism, he {the teacher} will criticize frankly again (fr. 64). . . . [And although he {the student} disobeyed earlier, disdaining the reproach as foreign {to himself}], later he will [give up] and obey the admonition. Then, he was afflicted with passions that puff one up or generally hinder one, but afterwards, when he has been relieved, he will pay heed (fr. 66)” (ET David Konstan et al., *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism* [SBLTT 43; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998], 71–73).

⁶⁵ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38, describes the ideal Cynic as follows: “[He] will strive to preserve his individuality in seemly fashion and with steadfastness, never deserting his post of duty, but always honoring and promoting virtue and sobriety and trying to lead all men thereto, partly by persuading and exhorting, partly by abusing and reproaching, in the hope that he may thereby rescue somebody from folly and from low desires and intemperance and soft living, taking them aside privately one by one and also admonishing them in groups every time he finds the opportunity, ‘With gentle words at times, at others harsh.’” On the mixed method of praise and blame, see Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (NovTSup 81; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 69–98.

The occurrent experience of shame brought about by acts of shaming has the potential to alter our dispositional sense of shame because it introduces a new perspective into our psyche. It forces us to see ourselves from the gaze of another and from a different court of opinion. When Socrates seeks to transform Alcibiades's ambition, he first unsettles the young man's deep self-confidence through shame. He remarks to Alcibiades, "But surely that is disgraceful (*αἰσχρόν*); ... are you not ashamed (*αἰσχύνω*) to be unable ... to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful (*αἰσχρόν*)?"⁶⁶ In one short paragraph, Socrates uses variations of the word "shame" three times to bring Alcibiades to self-examination. Before Socrates came along, Alcibiades was not aware of his own limitations. It is only after Socrates's shaming refutation and the accompanying occurrent experience of shame that he admits, "I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a very disgraceful (*αἴσχιστα*) condition."⁶⁷

The occurrent experience of shame brings about

the *painful* cognitive-affective recognition of the gaze of an other that reveals a certain inadequacy in the self. But what can be *beneficial* about the experience is that it can reveal a common truth between the agent and patient, the speaker and audience: one can feel ashamed before an other *because* one shares with that other the judgment that one's behavior is a violation of some shared ideal or standard of propriety. Thus, the recognition inherent to the feeling of being ashamed before an other can consist in the acknowledgement that a deserved rebuke or reproach has been given by this other.⁶⁸

At the same time, the rebuke given by the other can also direct our attention to a certain court of opinion which is different from the majority but which nevertheless is much more important. This is seen in Plato's *Gorgias*. Many recognize the major role that shame plays in Socrates's refutation of Gorgias, Pollus, and Callicles.⁶⁹ At the end of the dialogue, Socrates presents a myth. The myth recounts the trial that humans must face at the end of their life and that determines whether they are sent to the Isles of the Blest or to Tartarus. The men on trial stand naked and alone before the divine judge so that the judgment may be just. In this way, those who committed injustice will have the ugly scars of false oaths, license, luxury, insolence, and incontinence whipped on their souls, visible to all.⁷⁰ The nakedness and judgment tropes in this myth are tropes commonly connected to shame, strongly suggesting that this myth serves as an illustration of Socrates's shaming elenchus. In

⁶⁶ Plato, [*Alc. maj.*] 108E–109A.

⁶⁷ Plato, [*Alc. maj.*] 127D. The occurrent experience of shame is critical to Alcibiades's description of the effect that Socrates had on him in Plato's *Symposium*. Alcibiades states, "And there is one experience I have in presence of this man [Socrates] alone, such as nobody would expect in me,—to be made to feel ashamed [*αἰσχύνω*] by anyone; he alone can make me feel it" (Plato, *Symp.* 216B).

⁶⁸ Tarnopolsky, *Prides, Perverts, and Tyrants*, 99–100, italics original.

⁶⁹ See Gregory Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983): 27–58; Richard McKim, "Shame and Truth in Plato's *Gorgias*," in *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings* (ed. Charles L. Griswold Jr.; London: Routledge, 1988), 34–48; Dustin A. Gish, "Rivals in Persuasion: Gorgianic Sophistic versus Socratic Rhetoric," *Polis* 23 (2006): 46–73.

⁷⁰ Plato, *Gorg.* 523E–525A.

his shaming rhetoric, Socrates presents the painful medicine of having our wrongdoings exposed before one whose court of opinion supremely matters. In contrast to the verdict of a human court, Socrates sets before Callicles the portrait of a court whose opinion is far more important—the court of the divine judge. Socrates ends the myth with a final rebuke and warning,

I make it a reproach [ὀνειδίζω] to *you*, that you will not be able to deliver yourself when your trial comes and the judgment of which I told you just now; but when you go before your judge, the son of Aegina, and he grips you and drags you up, you will gape and feel dizzy there . . . and someone perhaps will give you, yes, a degrading box on the ear, and will treat you with every kind of contumely.⁷¹

3. *Comparing Paul and other Greco-Roman philosophers.* When we compare Paul with the other Greco-Roman thinkers in our brief survey, we find that there are similarities and differences with regard to their understanding of the role that shame plays in moral formation.

a. *Similarities.* Both Paul and Greco-Roman moralists acknowledge that they cannot change people's practical decision-making abilities without first engaging their emotions and emotional dispositions. They affirm the positive role that retrospective shame can play and advocate a guarded use of shaming to cause their readers to examine their own lives from a different moral framework. Such an approach stands in contrast to our modern understanding which generally impugns the value of shame as a moral emotion. For example, June Tangney and Ronda Dearing remark, "Shame . . . does little to inhibit immoral action. Instead, painful feelings of shame seem to promote self-destructive behaviors . . . that can be viewed as misguided attempts to dampen or escape this most punitive moral emotion."⁷² Part of this tension may be resolved when we remember that Greek and Latin words do not map neatly into modern English emotional vocabulary. For example, David Konstan remarks, "Greece and Rome did not have distinct terms for what we call shame and guilt, and they seem to have made do with one concept where we recognize two."⁷³

In their effort to reconfigure the value system of their readers, both use the rhetoric of shame to direct their readers' attention to a court of opinion which is different from the majority but which is nevertheless more significant. It is from this court of opinion that values of honor and shame must be evaluated. Shaming refutations in Plato and Paul highlight the importance of these significant court of

⁷¹ Plato, *Gorg.* 526E–527A.

⁷² June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing, *Shame and Guilt* (New York: Guilford, 2002), 138. Paul Glibert, "Evolution, Social Roles, and the Differences in Shame and Guilt," *Social Research* 70.4 (2003): 1225, also writes, "Shame is ultimately about punishment, is self-focused and 'wired into' the defense system. Shaming people can lead to various unhelpful defensive emotions, such as anger or debilitating anxiety, concealment or destructive conformity. Moreover, in a shame system people can behave very immorally in order to court favor with their superiors and avoid being rejected for not complying with requests or orders. Prestige seeking and shame avoidance can lead to some very destructive behaviors indeed."

⁷³ Konstan, *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 92.

opinions by alluding to judgment motifs. Both present their readers as standing before a divine judge. For Plato, the court of opinion that matters most is truth; for Paul, it is God.

Both Paul and the moral philosophers also affirm that shaming rhetoric is not the only tool in the moralist's toolbox, such that every situation is a nail to be hammered by shame. Harsh rhetoric needs to be balanced with gentle words.⁷⁴ In 1 Corinthians, Paul offers little praise or commendation apart from the opening thanksgiving. Nevertheless, in 1 Cor 11:2, Paul praises the Corinthians for remembering him and maintaining the traditions just as he had handed them to the community. It is possible to take this praise as ironic or as a rhetorical *captatio benevolentiae* to introduce 1 Corinthians 11–14. However, Richard Hays's reconstruction of the situation is more persuasive.⁷⁵ The Corinthians expressed their intention to follow Paul's directives concerning traditions but have genuine questions about matters of head coverings. Anthony Thiselton shrewdly remarks that "Paul always stands warmly alongside those who admit to perplexity or seek advice. It is when they claim no need of advice, or act unilaterally with complacency rather than consultation, that he becomes sharply polemical."⁷⁶ This stance is confirmed in 4:21 where Paul warns the Corinthians as a father, "What do you wish? Shall I come to you with a stick (ῥάβδος), or with love and a gentle spirit?"⁷⁷ Paul does not seek confrontation, but if some persist in ignoring his teaching, he will have no choice but to be harsh.

b. *Differences*. Despite the similarities that Paul shares with other moral philosophers, there are also differences. The moral philosophers seek to develop a dispositional sense of shame (αἰδώς) and relate it to σωφροσύνη. Paul's goal in 1 Corinthians is not so much σωφροσύνη as it is the νοῦς Χριστοῦ. When Paul exhorts his readers not to be children but adults in their thinking (φρήν; 14:20), he is encouraging them to adopt a cruciform mindset. The cruciform pattern of life that Christ lived in self-sacrificial love and faithful obedience to God must function as the theological criterion to guide their communal life and structure their moral thinking.⁷⁸ In a community that is wracked with discord and dissensions, Paul places the "community as a whole under the *criterion and identity of the cross of Christ*."⁷⁹

The moral philosophers stress the importance of reason and reliance on the self for moral growth. For Paul, "Human prudential reasoning and testing is demanded, but it is informed not only by one's own mind but also by the mind of Christ. The capacity to see truly and to act appropriately is enabled by the Holy

⁷⁴ See 2 Cor 2:6–8 where Paul advises the Corinthians that the punishment inflicted on the wrongdoer by the majority is enough. They should instead now forgive and console him so that he is not overwhelmed by excessive sorrow.

⁷⁵ Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians* (IBC; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 182–83.

⁷⁶ Thiselton, *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 810.

⁷⁷ Philo, *Post.* 97: "The rod [ῥάβδος] is a symbol of discipline, for there is no way of taking to heart warning and correction, unless for some offences one is chastised and brought to a sense of shame."

⁷⁸ See, for example, 5:2, 7–8; 6:7, 20; 7:3–4; 8:11–13; 9:19–23; 10:31–11:1; 11:23–29; 13:1–7; 14:1–5.

⁷⁹ Thiselton, *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 33.

Spirit.”⁸⁰ The role that the Holy Spirit plays is firmly established in 1:18–2:16. The mind of Christ is connected to the revelatory work of the Holy Spirit. In contrast to the world, believers have been given the Spirit of God which enables them to understand the things that God has freely given (2:12), that is, the Spirit enables them to exercise discernment in line with the mind of Christ. Such discernment is not possible for the unspiritual person (ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος) because they are spiritually discerned (πνευματικῶς ἀνακρίνεται; 2:14).

III. CONCLUSION

This investigation has shown that 1 Corinthians 4:14, rightly understood, envisions a positive use of shame. There is no fundamental tension between 4:14 and 6:5; 15:34. On the contrary, 4:14 functions as the paradigm for understanding Paul’s rhetoric of shame in 1 Corinthians. Paul uses shame as a pedagogical tool for transforming the minds of his readers into the mind of Christ. In his use of shame, Paul’s moral logic stands within the broad stream of character ethics adopted by many Greco-Roman moralists—both recognize that the occurrent experience of shame can alter our dispositional sense of shame, causing us to adopt a new set of standards, rules, and goals. Nevertheless, the substructure of Paul’s logic is heavily influenced by his religious convictions. Human reasoning and effort are needed; but the ability to act wisely, to build up the community, to discipline and punish, and to discern the wisdom of God is made possible by the Holy Spirit. More importantly, the goal of Paul’s rhetoric of shame is not the development of a dispositional sense of αἰδώς but the transformation of minds into the cruciform pattern of the Messiah.

⁸⁰ Luke T. Johnson, “Transformation of the Mind and Moral Discernment in Paul,” in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 235.