

EXPECTATIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF RESURRECTION AS “BODILY”

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Abstract: *Studies of resurrection belief in the Bible and Second Temple Jewish texts tend to present one of two views. One I call the “open-referent/open-source resurrection” view, according to which early Jews and Christians used resurrection language in such a way that it may or may not have involved a body, and the source domain for metaphorical uses of such language was an ambiguous revival. The other I call the “body-referent/body-source resurrection” view, according to which this resurrection language entailed involvement of the body, and the source domain for metaphorical uses of such language was restoration to bodily life that implied upward physical movement. In this study I evaluate these views and the expectations they produce for what the audience should find in resurrection texts in light of analyzing OT and Second Temple Jewish texts and applying resulting insights to the resurrection presented in Daniel 12 and 1 Corinthians 15 (particularly, Jesus’s resurrection). I argue that the body-referent/body-source resurrection view produces expectations that better comport with the content of these texts, especially since it better fits the semantics of the resurrection verbs in their contexts and the implications of the metaphorical uses.*

Key words: *bodily resurrection, spiritual resurrection, metaphorical resurrection, resurrection semantics, Second Temple resurrection belief, Daniel 12, 1 Corinthians 15*

An ongoing debate exists in scholarship about resurrection belief among early Jews and early Christians. This debate involves whether these people thought that resurrection language entailed a bodily event or if they thought it could involve other anthropological aspects in such a way as to be nonbodily. Of further interest is the question of how metaphorical uses of resurrection language—readily acknowledged by all—that do not refer to a literal return from death contribute to understanding what these ancient people expected to be involved in resurrection. The scholarly views on the possibilities can be divided into two broad views that could be further subdivided according to views on particular texts (though not for my purposes here).¹ What I call the “open-referent resurrection” view states that, even prior to Gnostic uses of resurrection language, early Jews and early Christians presented expectations of eschatological resurrection that could or could not involve the body in literal expressions.² I also describe it as “open-source” because its

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¹ That is, scholars of these two broad views do not read all texts the same way, as some representatives of the first view may see bodily resurrection in more texts than others, and some representatives of the second view may see more texts as using resurrection language metaphorically than others.

² Representatives of this view include Hans Clemens Caesarius Cavallin, *Life after Death: Paul’s Argument for the Resurrection of the Dead in 1 Cor. 15*, part 1: *An Enquiry into the Jewish Background*, ConBNT 7:1

notion of the source domain for metaphorical resurrection texts is more open-ended in terms of a simple revival, in which the body may or may not play a part. The opposition to this position is the “body-referent resurrection” view, according to which, prior to Gnostic uses of resurrection language, early Jews and early Christians presented expectations of eschatological resurrection that necessarily involved the body in literal expressions, whether the body was explicitly referenced or not.³ The “body-source” aspect of this description conveys that, in metaphorical uses of resurrection language, the source domain remains a bodily event, namely restoration of a dead body to life that also implied an upward physical movement.⁴ Both views recognize the importance of analyzing the character of the “source domain” from which the ancient authors drew the conceptual metaphor of resurrection and in the light of which they understood the “target domain” (often, the restoration of Israel or healing) for understanding resurrection language more broadly.⁵ What is at issue in the cases of metaphorical usage is which view more accurately conveys the character of the source domain.

Gnostic uses (and, by implication, a time in the second century) are the cutoff here because scholars in both camps recognize that Gnostics use resurrection lan-

(Lund: Gleerup, 1974); Bruce D. Chilton, *Resurrection Logic: How Jesus' First Followers Believed God Raised Him from the Dead* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2019), esp. 58–64; John J. Collins, “The Afterlife in Apocalyptic Literature,” in *Judaism in Late Antiquity 4: Death, Life-after-death, Resurrection, and the World-to-Come in the Judaisms of Antiquity*, ed. Alan J. Avery-Peck and Jacob Neusner, HdO 49 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 119–39; C. D. Elledge, *Resurrection of the Dead in Early Judaism 200 BCE–CE 200* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5–6, 20–31; Mark T. Finney, *Resurrection, Hell and the Afterlife: Body and Soul in Antiquity, Judaism and Early Christianity* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 25–99; Outi Lehtipuu, “Biblical Body Language: The Spiritual and the Bodily Resurrection,” in *Anthropology in the New Testament and Its Ancient Context: Papers from the EABS-Meeting in Pilisecaba/Budapest*, ed. Michael Labahn and Outi Lehtipuu, CBET 54 (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 151–68; George W. E. Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism and Early Christianity*, exp. ed., HTS 56 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

³ Representatives of this view include John Granger Cook, *Empty Tomb, Resurrection, Apotheosis*, WUNT 2/410 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018); Cook, “Resurrection in Paganism and the Question of an Empty Tomb in 1 Corinthians 15,” *NTS* 63 (2017): 56–75; Cook, “The Use of ἀνίστημι and ἐγείρω and the ‘Resurrection of a Soul,’” *ZNW* 108.2 (2017): 259–80; Lidija Novakovic, *Raised from the Dead according to Scripture: The Role of Israel's Scripture in the Early Christian Interpretations of Jesus' Resurrection*, T&T Clark Jewish and Christian Texts 12 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2012), 70–113; James P. Ware, “The Resurrection of Jesus in the Pre-Pauline Formula of 1 Cor 15.3–5,” *NTS* 60.4 (2014): 490–97; N. T. Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God*, COQG 3 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), esp. xix, 30–31, 83–84, 330.

⁴ A. J. M. Wedderburn argues in a more diachronic fashion that, originally, “it was not expected that there could be an ἀνάστασις that only involved the soul. I say ‘originally’ because we shall see that the physical connotations of the term came to be weakened and it was reinterpreted to make it more congenial to different ways of thought.” A. J. M. Wedderburn, *Baptism and Resurrection: Studies in Pauline Theology against Its Graeco-Roman Background*, WUNT 44 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 167–68.

⁵ In the terms of metaphor theory, the source domain is the conceptual domain from which a metaphor is drawn that frames the target domain so that the latter is understood in a given way. If Ezekiel 37 conveys the notion that return or restoration is resurrection, “resurrection” is the source domain that frames the target domain of return or restoration in terms of a return from the grave by God's power. For more on “source domain” and “target domain,” see Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4–10.

guage to refer to events that explicitly do not involve the body.⁶ In dispute is how the language is used beforehand and thus whether or not Gnostic uses of resurrection language represent a departure from previous Jewish and Christian tendencies.

In addition to the question of what given texts say or do not say about resurrection, an underexplored aspect of the debate involves how the expectations of scholars contribute to their definitions of resurrection belief. I suggest that a major impetus for the open-referent/open-source view is that expectations of scholars have been violated, having been based on presuppositions about what should be present, rather than being expectations that emerge from ancient conventions *per se*. Namely, the violated expectation is that a body should be explicitly referenced if the author expects bodily resurrection, which entails, for these scholars, that the modality of resurrection is potentially nonbodily in the absence of explicit references.⁷

I argue that the body-referent/body-source resurrection view produces expectations for reading early Jewish and early Christian texts that better comport with what those texts convey, especially because this view comports better with the semantics of the resurrection verbs in their contexts, whether a body is explicitly referenced or not. I also argue that this view is more consistent with the implications of the metaphorical uses of resurrection language. In short, this view rightly discerns from these factors what expectations are licensed by the use of resurrection language, even when “body” language is not explicitly present. That is, in cases where the modality is not expressly stated, the expectations of what resurrection language means according to ancient conventions rely on a bodily event being literally or metaphorically evoked, unless the context explicitly shows otherwise. To demonstrate this thesis, I first explore, with primary reference to the illustrative example of Mark Finney’s work, how these views are articulated in relation to OT and Second Temple Jewish texts used to address questions of modality (i.e., whether the resurrection is bodily or not). Second, I consider the factors by which we identify resurrection texts and how those factors contribute to the question of what expectations of meaning are licensed by the use of resurrection verbs in their contexts based on analysis of the given texts. Third, I apply these considerations to two prominent biblical texts regularly ensconced in this debate: Daniel 12 (specifically verses 2–3 and 13) and 1 Corinthians 15 (particularly Jesus’s resurrection as related in verses 3–4). I have chosen these texts not only because of their significance as articulations of resurrection belief in the OT and the NT, but also because interpretations of both illustrate well the role that expectations (whether brought to the text or licensed by other texts demonstrating ancient conventions) play in the interpre-

⁶ On the Gnostic distinction, as Cook states, “Modern scholarship has found reasons, some quite good, to doubt the utility of ‘Gnostics’ and ‘Gnosticism’ as overarching analytical categories. Celsus [Origen, *Cels.* 5.59, 61], however, was able to distinguish between ‘Gnostics’ and the ‘great church,’ and the term ‘Gnostic’ remains useful” (*Empty Tomb*, 37).

⁷ The issue here is not about dishonesty or bias, but about response to expectation violation, as there are demonstrably different responses here to the presence or absence of an element based on presuppositions brought to the text that one may not recognize.

tation of whether the resurrection is bodily. They are especially apt examples because Daniel 12 does not explicitly mention a body, and 1 Corinthians 15 uses “body” language frequently but does not mention an empty tomb. In different ways, both texts can be illuminated when they are read in light of expectations formed by the use of resurrection language in the ancient context.

I. RESURRECTION TEXTS AND MODALITY

Scholars on both sides of this debate generally agree that the texts attesting to belief in bodily resurrection include the following: 2 Macc 7:9, 11, 14, 23, 29; 12:43–44; 14:46; 1 En. 51; Sib. Or. 4.181–183; 2 Bar. 50:2–51:6; T. Jud. 25:1–4 (cf. T. Sim. 6:7; T. Zeb. 10:2); LAB 3:10; Ps.-Phoc. 100–115; 4Q521 (also note Apoc. Zeph. 10:12–14). One could also add to this list what appears to have become a free-floating story designated as fragment 1 of the Apocryphon of Ezekiel. By its famous parable of the cooperation of a blind man and a lame man to take fruit from a king’s tree, this story justifies bodily resurrection as necessary for the final judgment, so that soul and body must undergo judgment together for deeds in which both participated. One can also add the resurrection text of 4QsEzek^a/4Q385, which treats the vision of Ezekiel 37:1–14 as literal and, therefore, as articulating expectation of bodily resurrection. The rabbis also argued for the necessity of bodily resurrection, particularly for the purposes of justice and judgment (e.g., b. Sanh. 91b; Sipre Deut. 306.35; Gen. Rab. 14.5; Pesiq. Rab. 1.7).

However, some scholars claim that a few Jewish texts present a type of spiritual resurrection where the body has no clear role in the eschaton or present a belief about postmortem fate different from the resurrection interpretation of the same texts. The scene in 1 Enoch 22:8–14 allegedly teaches a spiritual resurrection by means of denying that the spirits of the wicked will be “raised” (μετεγείρω in v. 13) from the pits where they reside.⁸ Other texts thought to present this belief include 1 Enoch 103:3–4, 108:8–15, and, less directly, 91:10, 92:3–4, and 104:2.⁹ Bruce Chilton insists that bodily resurrection is only one of five types of resurrection; the other four include being resurrected as spirits (for which he cites 1 Enoch 22 and Jubilees 23:31),¹⁰ being made like the stars (Daniel 12 and associated texts), being raised to angelic status (for which he notes Philo), and being resurrected as immortal souls (for which he cites 1 Enoch 22, Wisdom of Solomon 3, and Philo).¹¹

Mark T. Finney goes further in arguing that there is no unambiguous example of bodily resurrection in the OT and Second Temple texts. He begins from the assumption that Sheol texts refer to the fates of humans as souls/shades (his and

⁸ Elledge, *Resurrection*, 136; Lehtipuu, “Biblical Body Language,” 158; Nickelsburg, *Resurrection*, 168–70.

⁹ Cavallin, *Life*, 47–48; Elledge, *Resurrection*, 25–26; Lehtipuu, “Biblical Body Language,” 158–59; Nickelsburg, *Resurrection*, 174.

¹⁰ Cf. Finney, *Resurrection*, 54; Lehtipuu, “Biblical Body Language,” 159.

¹¹ Chilton, *Resurrection Logic*, 58–64.

many others’ preferred understanding of רפאים).¹² With that point established as an apparent baseline, he interprets all other OT and Second Temple texts, including resurrection texts, as referring to the same kind of fate. Despite how insecure this supposition is, he rejects interpretations of texts as referring to bodily resurrection as “insecure” and thus not to be preferred to his interpretation.¹³ He concludes after his review of the texts, “In summary ... if we include the Scrolls alongside the wealth of Second Temple Jewish literature outlined above, there are no texts up to and beyond the first Jewish war which speak unambiguously of the resurrection of the *physical* body.”¹⁴

Finney’s work is flawed for multiple reasons. First, the presumption that Sheol belief consisted of a fate that concerned the “shade” or “soul” of the person and not the body is by no means clearly justified. Isaiah 14:9 is one of only two cases in which this noun appears in proximity to a reference to Sheol (also see Prov 9:18), though it appears an additional six times in the OT (Job 26:5; Ps 88:10; Prov 2:18; 21:16; Isa 26:14, 19). This term is often presumed to refer to “shades” (translated into our favored cultural terminology of “souls”) because scholars tend to depend on an Ugaritic cognate. But in view of its actual use in Hebrew, I am inclined to agree with Eriks Galenieks that it is simply a way of referring to the dead and not to a distinct anthropological aspect or substance of the dead.¹⁵ More importantly, several texts explicitly or implicitly describe bodies—as well as other physical objects—as going down to or being present in Sheol (Num 16:30–33; Pss 16:10; 55:15–16; 141:7; Prov 1:12; Isa 14:11–15; Ezek 31:15–17; 32:21, 27; Jon 2:2). Likewise, Sheol is frequently associated with the grave, hence the common use of the verb “go down” (יָרַד) to refer to entering Sheol (beyond texts already noted, see Gen 37:35; 42:38; 44:29, 31; 1 Sam 2:6; 1 Kgs 2:6, 9; Job 7:9; 17:16; Pss 30:4; Prov 5:5; 7:27; Isa 5:14; 38:18).

Second, because this idea about Sheol is his baseline and because Finney’s method of argumentation is to reject that which is “insecure,” for his argumentation to be coherent, we would also need to reject his interpretations. That is, Finney’s method in interpreting these texts and in adjudicating between alternative interpretations ultimately undermines itself. He has frequently cut short the examination of these resurrection texts, as well as the consideration of what does or does not constitute a resurrection text.

Third, Finney does not engage in semantic analysis and consider how it might impact his interpretations of the text. Not every text involves key terms for resurrection, nor do any of them use technical terminology for resurrection. But the fact that Finney is missing the semantic analysis of the key terms altogether represents a fundamental failure of his review of resurrection texts. Without such an analysis, it

¹² Finney, *Resurrection*, 25–27.

¹³ Finney, *Resurrection*, 32–34, 55–60, 65–66.

¹⁴ Finney, *Resurrection*, 86, emphasis his.

¹⁵ Eriks Galenieks, “The Nature, Function, and Purpose of the Term Sheol in the Torah, Prophets, and Writings” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 2005), 149–51.

is unclear on what basis he begins to determine which texts are resurrection texts (even if there is ambiguity about the boundaries).

Fourth, Finney's account cannot adequately explain why the rabbis, in distinction from all other Jews before them, argued for bodily resurrection (and even among the rabbis he sees conflicting data).¹⁶ After all, on this account, the established use of resurrection language in Jewish tradition, as opposed to Greek tradition (by his own argument),¹⁷ was to refer to a nonbodily event. In the case of Gnostics, the fusion of elements from Judaism, Christianity, and Greco-Roman philosophies with their peculiar mythological framework, explains well enough why the Gnostics would use resurrection language in a fashion that would explicitly have no reference to the body. But no such account can be clearly given for why the rabbis would develop their expectations in this way against all precedent.

But the example of Finney nevertheless illustrates the crucial role of expectations in analyzing these texts. For Finney, the expectation formed by the belief that Sheol was a destination for the soul/shade denuded of the body entailed that this was the regnant belief among Jews, meaning that resurrection texts would need to be read in this light. For the less extreme open-referent/open-source resurrection scholars, Outi Lehtipuu summarizes well how their expectations influence their reading: "There are texts that talk about the dead being raised but do not describe how this is accomplished, whether it involves a body or not."¹⁸ In other words, the expectations of the open-referent/open-source view on resurrection are built on a sense of inherent ambiguity, according to which one could expect, if a bodily resurrection is articulated, there would be a need for specification and disambiguation for authors to avoid confusion and make the point more directly. Thus, another expectation produced by this view is that resurrection language could apply to multiple anthropological aspects or substances. These expectations must be tested against the texts. But first, there needs to be clarity about what we refer to when we refer to "resurrection texts."

II. WHAT MAKES A TEXT ABOUT RESURRECTION?

I do not suppose that there is a bounded set of texts that can be referred to without ambiguity as "resurrection texts" and that strictly attending to these texts alone will answer questions about whether eschatological expectations of resurrection were bodily in character. But we should at least search for characteristic elements of resurrection texts in a centered set approach that allows for some texts to be ambiguous as to whether they are about resurrection and as to whether they are texts of literal or metaphorical reference.¹⁹ Too often, scholars do not attend to such considerations. For example, Chilton articulates his fivefold typology of resur-

¹⁶ Finney, *Resurrection*, 86–94.

¹⁷ Finney, *Resurrection*, 6–20.

¹⁸ Lehtipuu, "Biblical Body Language," 153.

¹⁹ For a similar, albeit more metaphorically guided, analysis, see Frederick S. Tappenden, *Resurrection in Paul: Cognition, Metaphor, and Transformation*, ECL 19 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 44–67.

rection expectations, but he never explains on what basis he regards these various texts as constituting resurrection. This is especially applicable to Chilton’s inclusion of Philo, since Philo is generally regarded as someone who did not teach others to expect resurrection.

What we must look for are one or more of the following features. One, there are clusters of terms commonly associated with resurrection in both Hebrew and Greek (which are noted below).²⁰ But we must rely on context beyond those terms, as no term was reserved for referring to resurrection until Christians coined *resurrectio* in Latin. There were phrases that functioned as technical phrases for resurrection—such as ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν in Greek and תחיית המתים in Hebrew among the rabbis—but the fact that it is phrases that function technically points to the importance of contextual factors. Two, the context will generally directly or indirectly state that the object or subject of resurrection was, is, or will be dead prior to the action of the verb. Three, especially in reference to eschatological resurrection, there will be some contextual clue that the setting of the action is eschatological, such as through reference to “the end,” through correspondence of the end with the beginning (connecting protology and eschatology), or via eschatological tropes like the final judgment or the reception of everlasting life. Four, particularly in contexts featuring one or more of the other features, the text may “license” the use of other terminology for referring to the resurrection. Five, sometimes phraseology or imagery derived from texts linked with resurrection, whether or not fulfilling one of the previous conditions, will appear as signals of resurrection belief/expectation. Daniel 12 and Ezekiel 37, among others, were broadly influential for the language of Second Temple, rabbinic, and early Christian texts in articulating resurrection.²¹ With these potential characteristics in mind, we must now turn to consider their presence and functions in the given texts, beginning with the texts generally regarded as referring to bodily resurrection.

1. *Features of texts cited as bodily resurrection texts.* Verbs often used in resurrection texts more broadly in Greek, particularly in the NT, also appear in these bodily resurrection texts. Those verbs are ἀνίστημι (2 Macc 7:9, 14; 12:44; T. Sim. 6:7; T. Jud. 25:1, 4; T. Zeb. 10:2; cf. ἵστημι in Sib. Or. 4.182) and ἐγείρω (much more common in the NT and subsequent Christian literature, but see the LXX of 2 Kgs 4:31; Isa 26:19; Sir 48:5; as well as ἐξεγείρω in Dan 12:2 [Θ] and 1 Cor 6:14). These verbs broadly correspond to the Hebrew קום (2 Kgs 13:21; Job 14:12; 19:25; Isa 26:14; Hos 6:2) or עמד (Ezek 37:10; Dan 12:13) in the case of ἀνίστημι, and קם (2 Kgs 4:31; Job 14:12; Isa 26:19; Dan 12:2) in the case of ἐγείρω.²² As John Granger

²⁰ For an analysis of such terms in the OT, see John F. A. Sawyer, “Hebrew Words for the Resurrection of the Dead,” *VT* 23 (1973): 218–34. More generally, see Cook, *Empty Tomb*, 7–49; Erich Fascher, “Anastasis–Resurrectio–Auferstehung: Eine programmatische Studie zum Thema ‘Sprache und Offenbarung,’” *ZNW* 40 (1941): 166–229.

²¹ I have not included here 4 Ezra 7:32, which resembles the tristich of 1 Enoch 51:1 discussed below, as well as the language of Isaiah 26:19 and Daniel 12:2. But as with those texts, for reasons explained below, it is reasonable to see in 4 Ezra reference to bodily resurrection.

²² The correspondence is not precise, of course. For example, while Θ translates קם in Daniel 12:2 with the synonymous ἐξεγείρω, the LXX/OG translates with ἀνίστημι.

Cook observes, the basic meaning of both verbs is to “imply a physical motion upward from the state of sleep, lying down or death – in contexts where individuals are sleeping, lying down or dead.”²³ Cook, drawing from Ammonius, also makes a slight general distinction—that still collapses on occasion—between ἀνίστημι and ἐγείρω in that the former refers to arising from a sitting or supine position while the latter refers to arising from sleep.²⁴ In broader Greek usage, authors use both terms to refer to raising from the dead, but they seem to prefer ἐγείρω for rousing from sleep and connected ideas (such as to become sober or to take heart), whereas they prefer ἀνίστημι for raising in building action (such as in erecting or restoring) or in “standing” to take action.²⁵ Similar ranges of meaning are also operative in NT usage, though it is also notable that ἐγείρω also appears in contexts of healing, causing to exist, or arising to take action.²⁶ Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida likewise include ἐγείρω in the semantic domains of change of state (by restoring), existing (causing to exist), standing, waking, health (restoring someone to health), and living (living again after being raised from death), while they include ἀνίστημι in the semantic domains of standing and living (living again after being raised from death).²⁷ These observations also apply to the corresponding nouns of ἀνάστασις (2 Macc 7:14; 12:43; cf. Liv. Pro. 2:15) and the less common ἐγείρσις.²⁸

The semantic force of these verbs and their associated nouns implies physical and bodily movement. Notably, the soul or spirit, as distinguished from the body, is never—at least prior to Gnostic literature—the object of these verbs in contexts of resurrection in Jewish, Christian, or Greek texts in general (the one possible exception of the use of μετεγείρω in 1 Enoch 22:13 will be discussed below).²⁹ The verbs can in some cases be used for “rousing,” “stimulating [to stand],” or similar notions applied to the soul or spirit of those who are not dead, but even here the sense derives from the source domain of bodily action.³⁰ The bodily character of resurrection is implied in that what is asleep—particularly, as shown below, in the earth—is that which awakens.

Nor can these terms be simple references to elevation or ascension. James P. Ware summarizes this point well for ἐγείρω:

²³ Cook, “Resurrection,” 59. Cf. Ware, “Resurrection,” 492–94.

²⁴ Cook, “Resurrection,” 58–59.

²⁵ Franco Montanari, ed., *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), s.v. ἀνίστημι, ἐγείρω.

²⁶ BDAG, s.v. ἀνίστημι, ἐγείρω.

²⁷ L&N 13.65, 83; 17.7, 9–10; 23.77, 94, 140.

²⁸ One also finds in 2 Maccabees 7:9 the noun ἀναβίωσις, which is associated with another resurrection verb ἀναβιώω, which has a more generic sense of “revival” (cf. Josephus, *Ant.* 18.14).

²⁹ The verb ἐγείρω in particular was not often used for referring to resurrection outside of Christian and (to a lesser extent) Jewish literature because the description of death in terms of “sleep” was fairly common in Jewish and Christian literature (1 Kgs 1:21; Job 3:13; 14:12; Pss 13:3; 22:29; 76:5; Isa 26:19; Jer 51:39, 57; Dan 12:2; Nah 3:18; Matt 27:52; John 11:11–13; Acts 7:60; 13:36; 1 Cor 7:39; 11:30; 15:6, 18, 20, 51; 1 Thess 4:13–15; 5:10; 2 Pet 3:4), but not as much elsewhere.

³⁰ Cook, *Empty Tomb*, 30–37.

Thus the verb is regularly used to denote the raising or rising up of one who has fallen (LXX Exod 23.5; LXX 1 Kings 5.3; LXX Eccles 4.10; Jdt 10.23; Philo, Agr. 122; Mut. 56; Migr. 122; Matt 12.11; Mark 9.27; Acts 9.8; 1 Clem 59.4). It is also used of one kneeling or prostrate being raised back to a standing position (LXX 1 Kings 2.8; LXX 2 Kings 12.17; LXX Ps 112.7; LXX Dan 10.10; Philo, Ebr. 156; Post. 149; Matt 17.7; Luke 11.8; Acts 10.26; Hermas, Vis. 2.1.3; 3.2.4). The verb is used of one lying down, very frequently of one lying sick, who is restored to a standing posture (Matt 8.15; 9.5, 6, 7; Mark 1.31; 2.9, 11, 12; Luke 5.23–4; John 5.8; Acts 3.6–7; James 5.15). The verb is also frequently used of one sitting who rises to stand (LXX Ps 126.2; LXX Isa 14.9; Matt 26.46; Mark 3.3; 10.49; 14.42; Luke 6.8; John 11.29; 13.4; 14.31; Hermas, Vis. 1.4.1). In no instance within ancient Greek literature does *ἐγείρω* denote the concept of ascension, elevation or assumption. Rather, it denotes the action whereby one who is prone, sitting, prostrate or lying down is restored to a standing position.³¹

Cook also notes, “Physical motion upward (usually ‘standing up’) is implied in all these texts. Clearly the verb is not equivalent to ‘exalting’ (for which an ancient Greek author would use *ὑψόω*).”³² In all these ways, the terminology serves best as references to concrete, physical, bodily action, and refers to abstract actions only insofar as they are analogous to the bodily action. Thus, the conventional usage of resurrection terminology itself directs expectations in any would-be ambiguous cases toward a body-referent/body-source view of resurrection belief. Without explicit contextual indicators to the contrary, the most natural sense of the verbs is of action related to bodies.

These texts also feature frequent references to death in one fashion or another (2 Macc 7; 12:44; 14:46; 1 En. 51:1; Sib. Or. 4.181–182; 2 Bar 50; Ps.-Phoc. 100–103; 4QPsEzek^a frags. 2 and 3). This feature not only clarifies that the aforementioned verbs are resurrection uses of the terms in the given contexts, but it also provides a basis for a common use of verbs for coming to life or making alive to refer to resurrection. This is conveyed in Hebrew through the use of *חיה* (Deut 32:39; 1 Sam 2:6; 1 Kgs 17:21–22; 2 Kgs 13:21; Isa 26:19; Ezek 37:5–6, 9–10, 14; Hos 6:2) and in Greek through the use of *ζάω* (LXX of Deut 32:39; 4 Kgdms 13:21; Ezek 37:6, 9–10, 14; Hos 6:2; cf. 1 Kgdms 2:6).³³ The latter verb also appears in Sibylline Oracles 4.187 while the former verb appears in 4Q521 frags. 2 II, 12; 5 II, 6 (in participle form). In the case of the latter text, it is notable that this making the dead live follows as an amplification of healing the badly wounded (as in the similar relationship of Deuteronomy 32:39) and generally fits within a context of bodily benefits of God’s action.

There are also frequent eschatological links with these resurrection texts, especially with the trope of final judgment.³⁴ The mother of the seven sons in 2 Mac-

³¹ Ware, “Resurrection,” 494.

³² Cook, “Resurrection,” 59–60.

³³ In the NT, one also finds the related *ζωοποιέω* in John 5:21; Rom 4:17; 8:11; 1 Cor 15:22, 36, 45; 2 Cor 3:6; 1 Pet 3:18.

³⁴ For instances linking the resurrection with the language of judgment, see 2 Macc 7:9, 11, 14, 17, 19, 23, 29, 34–36; 12:43–45; 14:46; 1 En. 25:4; 27:3–5; 51; 61:8–11; 91:10–11, 14–15; 92:3–5; 100:4–5;

cabees 7:23 implicitly describes resurrection as an act of new creation by appealing to the stories of creation, particularly Genesis 2:7 (cf. 2 Macc 7:28–29). Ezekiel 37:9, 14 had already made a similar connection with similar language between creation and resurrection. The same notion and conceptual link as in Ezekiel 37 appear in Sibylline Oracles 4.181–183, where the verb for the raising action is also ὕστημι.

The main resurrection reference from the Similitudes of Enoch (1 En. 51) is extant only in Ethiopic, not in Greek. But it conveys bodily resurrection through reference to the earth giving back what has been deposited in it (i.e., through burial), Sheol giving back what it has received, and destruction giving back what it owes.³⁵ Subsequent to this raising action and the final judgment, the righteous are said to dwell and walk on the earth. Once again, there is no explicit “body” language, but the implications of the context are rather clear (as in Sibylline Oracles 4.187–188).

Pseudo-Philo’s *Biblical Antiquities* 3:10 has a similar tristich structure and it too is extant only in a non-Greek language, namely Latin. Still, the statement that God will bring to life (*vivificabo*) the dead and raise up (*erigam*, which overlaps significantly with ἐγείρω) from the earth those who are sleeping fits with language for resurrection that I have noted already. As in the previous text, the underworld and the place of perdition are also said to return what was deposited or repay what was indebted. This is also a text in which there is a new creation context. Also comparable to this is Pseudo-Philo’s *Biblical Antiquities* 19:12–13.

Pseudo-Phocylides 100–115 combines hopes for resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul, but once again communicates the former implicitly. The author warns against digging up, exposing, and dissecting corpses, because there is hope that the remains will come to light again out of the earth. Like the previous text, the key vocabulary is absent, but the implications of the imagery are clear enough to convey bodily resurrection.

In 2 Baruch 50:2–51:6 there are two emphases in the presentation of resurrection. On the one hand, chapter 50 insists on continuity and identifiability for the dead who will be raised, those that the earth gives back, those that will live again. On the other hand, chapter 51 stresses transformation. This latter theme is implied in many other resurrection texts, but it is given particular stress here, as it also receives in 1 Corinthians 15.

By now, one might note that, for texts that are generally regarded as conveying bodily resurrection, these texts do not feature the term σῶμα or equivalents. In 2 Maccabees 7:10–11, the third of seven brothers to be martyred says of his hands

102:4–11; 103:5–15; 108:8–15; Sib. Or. 4.179–192; Apocr. Ezek. frag. 1; Apoc. Zeph. 10:4–11; 4 Ezra 4:40–42; 7:32–44, 115, 128; 2 Bar. 50:2–4; 83; T. Zeb. 10:2–3; T. Benj. 10:6–11; LAB 3:10; 25:7; Pss. Sol. 3:12 (cf. 17:25–26); 1QH^a XII, 26–27; XIV, 18–19, 29; 4QAramaic Apocalypse/4Q246 II, 4–6; 4QInstruction^d/4Q418 69 II + 60, 7–8; 4QTQahat ar/4Q542 1 II, 3–8; Josephus, *Ant.* 18.14; *J.W.* 2.163; *Ag. Ap.* 2.217–18.

³⁵ This last part of the tristich may ultimately have its roots in reference to either אַבְדּוֹן/Abaddon (Job 26:6; 28:22; 31:12; Ps 88:11; Prov 15:11; cf. Prov 27:20) or שְׁחַת (Job 17:14; 33:18, 22, 24, 28, 30; Pss 16:10; 30:9; 49:7–9, 14–15; 55:23; 103:4; Isa 38:17; Ezek 28:8; Jon 2:6), both of which could be used as parallels to Sheol or simply as reference to a destructive fate (also see 1QS IV, 12; IX, 22; X, 19; 1QM III, 9; 1QH XII, 26; CD XIII, 14; XIV, 2; cf. 1QS III, 21; IX, 16; XI, 13; CD VI, 15).

that he received them from Heaven, he disdains them because of/for the sake of the law/Torah, and he hopes to receive them back (κομίζω, cf. v. 29) again. Razis in 2 Maccabees 14:46 throws his entrails into a hostile crowd and calls upon the Lord of life to give them back/restore them (ἀποδίδωμι) to him again (cf. 2 Macc 7:23). 4QpsEzek^a implies bodily resurrection because it applies the imagery of Ezekiel 37 literally. The only exception to this rule is fragment 1 of the Apocryphon of Ezekiel (preserved in Epiphanius, *Pan.* 64.70.5–17; cf. b. Sanh. 91a, b). It lacks the other characteristic resurrection terminology, but its entire point is the need for bodily resurrection for the final judgment.

Besides these more distant contextual clues, then, the main indications of bodily resurrection are the key terms related to the action of/on the dead. When presented without qualifier or special indication that it is being used in an unusual fashion, the vocabulary is sufficiently indicative of a bodily event. The more distant contextual clues simply confirm this point. For these texts, then, the body-referent/body-source view of resurrection belief supplies us with expectations that better fit with the texts as they are, where explicit indicators apart from the vocabulary are in fact relatively sparse. The open-referent/open-source view, with its expectations that the modality of resurrection can be open-ended and must be explicitly indicated to be bodily, does not supply such fitting expectations.³⁶ Nor does it fit with the terminology used in the OT, Second Temple, and especially NT texts. If modality were of no concern, it would have been sufficient to use terminology for exaltation or general ascension, such as עלה in Hebrew (which does appear alongside the aforementioned verbs in some resurrection texts) and ὑψώω in Greek.

2. *Metaphorical resurrection texts.* Of course, one must also reckon with the possibility of resurrection language being used metaphorically, so that its referent is not a bodily return from death. The most cited example of such metaphorical usage is Ezekiel 37:1–14, since this text includes an interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision that explicitly applies the resurrection imagery to the restoration and return of the covenant people to the promised land. While more controversial, the same reading is often applied to Isaiah 26:19.³⁷ While I think that the best reading of Isaiah 26:19 is as a literal reference to concrete, bodily resurrection, for the sake of the argument I will assume that it uses resurrection language similarly to Ezekiel 37. One could potentially add to these the texts of Deuteronomy 32:39 and 1 Samuel 2:6—where the question is if concrete resurrection is being applied in a greater-to-lesser fashion or if the resurrection language is simply used metaphorically for restoration or de-

³⁶ One example of this is Tappenden’s evasive comments about 2 Maccabees 7: “Corporeal resurrection is envisaged in 2 Maccabees as a response to the horrible and gruesome deaths that are described and thus is tied to the martyriological situation. As such, postmortem corporeality cannot be disconnected from the narratological world and thus should not be essentialized as central to notions of resurrection” (*Resurrection*, 51n24). Since one can find other bases for bodily resurrection belief in other texts, not to mention in the semantics of key terms, there is no reason to assume the basis is so narrow here.

³⁷ E.g., Lehtipuu, “Biblical Body Language,” 156. On this text and its complicated transmission history, see Cook, *Empty Tomb*, 459–62.

liverance—as well as Psalm 16:10 and Hosea 6:2.³⁸ None of these examples are noncontroversial, as even Ezekiel 37 was applied literally in 4QPsEzek^a, and the other texts have either been interpreted literally or applied concretely among the rabbis and early Christian teachers. But for the sake of the argument, I will assume that all these texts use resurrection language and imagery metaphorically.

Despite Ezekiel 37 being a metaphorical use of resurrection language, it is the most vivid depiction of resurrection as a bodily event in the OT, as it describes in detail the reassembly of bones, the reconnecting of sinew, and the reclotting with flesh, followed by the inspiration with God's Spirit. Isaiah 26:19 is similarly notable not only for its use of resurrection terms noted above (with *חיה*, *קום*, and *קיין* all appearing in Hebrew and the Greek verbs, or ones with similar sense, appearing variously in different Greek versions), but also for its references to “corpses” (*נבלה*) and those that dwell in the dust. And lest the previous description should not be clear enough as a reference to those who are buried, the last line refers to the earth giving birth to the deceased (*רפאים*). Hosea 6:2 uses similar resurrection language to Isaiah 26:19 (*חיה* and *קום*), albeit in a less vivid context, with the “raising” term *קום* translated as *ἀνέστη* in the LXX. The uses of resurrection language in Deuteronomy 32:39 and 1 Samuel 2:6 both refer to God killing and making alive, but they parallel this statement in different ways. In the former, this is paralleled with wounding and healing, while the latter parallels this statement with bringing down to Sheol and bringing up. The first line in both couplets most naturally derives from body imagery, the second part in Deuteronomy 32:39 makes this derivation even clearer, and the second part in 1 Samuel 2:6 does as well, as long as one remembers that the body goes to Sheol, per the aforementioned texts. Likewise, the deliverance from death and destruction/decay in Psalm 16:10 was vivid enough to be used by Peter and by Paul as a reference for Jesus's resurrection after his burial (Acts 2:25–32; 13:35–37), as both mention that his body did not undergo decay.

Whether one grants that only one (Ezek 37) or all these texts use resurrection language metaphorically, it is significant that in each the source domain is bodily return to life and rising from the state of death. The expectation even such a metaphorical reference creates is that the reader should understand these resurrection descriptions in bodily fashion, unless there is explicit signification to the contrary in the context. Even where the descriptions are most likely metaphorical, they rely on a source domain of a bodily event for transference to the referent of the metaphor.

III. TEXTS CITED AS NONBODILY RESURRECTION TEXTS

Still, we must address the texts that some scholars posit as contraindications to the points just argued. The most frequently cited of these is 1 Enoch 22:13. But the scene in 1 Enoch 22 is not one of any resurrection of spirits. Rather, the unusual terminology in both Ethiopic and Greek (*μετεγείρω*) signifies “removal” rather

³⁸ On these texts, see Jon D. Levenson, *Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Mamy Raharimanantsoa, *Mort et Espérance selon la Bible Hébraïque*, ConBOT 53 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2006).

than “resurrection.” At best, the movement of the spirits in question may be the first phase of resurrection: they are removed from this realm of the dead (or not removed, in the case of the wicked) to be reunited with their bodies. However, resurrection terminology does not apply to the spirits themselves, as is consistent with the observations of Cook and Ware.³⁹

Their observations hold true in the other texts as well. The case of 1 Enoch 103:3–4 from the Epistle of Enoch refers to revivification and honoring of souls/spirits in Ethiopic, but not to their “raising up.” The Greek lacks even this statement, merely saying that the spirits of the pious dead will not perish and, in verse 3, that good things are inscribed for their “souls” (ψυχῇ), which could be reflective of the Hebrew נַפֶּשׁ (as the Ethiopic is).⁴⁰ A similar idea might apply in the Ethiopic of verse 4, but in any case “revival” language is inherently more ambiguous than “rising” language, though it could be used for resurrection in some contexts (or in combination with “rising” language, as in 2 Kings 13:21, Isaiah 26:19, and Ezekiel 37:10).

By contrast, 1 Enoch 91:10 and 92:3–4 contain “rising/resurrection” language, where the terminology of “rising from sleep” (cf. Isa 26:19; Dan 12:2) refers to the person as a whole (i.e., as an embodied being).⁴¹ The latter text in particular implies this embodiment through the reference to those who have arisen from sleep as “walking” in righteousness/justice. Furthermore, one must consider these texts in the context of the larger Epistle of Enoch, particularly in light of the denial of the resurrection by the wicked mockers in 102:6–8. This is addressed in multiple cases before and after this mockery through resurrection, the description of which the author borrows from Daniel 12 (1 En. 91:10; 92:3–4; 104:1–4; 108:8–15). As such, as in other cases where it is not explicitly stated, it is a safe *prima facie* inference that these eschatological expectations of resurrection involve a bodily resurrection.

That leaves Jubilees 23:29–31. Here the terminology of “rising” is not applied directly to the spirits referenced in verse 31, but that does not prevent some from trying to argue for a link here. The text refers to the Lord healing his servants and their rising to see peace (v. 30), whereas it refers to the (dead) righteous seeing what the Lord does and their spirits being happy while their bones rest in the earth (vv. 30–31). As the Ethiopic is a general “rising” term and we do not have the relevant part of verse 30 in Hebrew (portions of the last part of v. 30 and v. 31 are extant in 4Q176a), it is difficult to tell whether this is a reference to resurrection, but it seems that the fates of the (living) servants and the (dead) righteous are distinguished. The latter appear to be described as resting in peace, satisfied in the Lord’s faithfulness, even if they do not partake of it in embodied life. There is also reference to increased life, but not necessarily everlasting life, and so even for those who are said to “complete” their days among the living (v. 29), it is not clear that the rising refers to resurrection. Alternatively, perhaps less likely, the bones may rest and the spirits

³⁹ For more on this text, see Cook, *Empty Tomb*, 478–81.

⁴⁰ Cook, *Empty Tomb*, 491–92.

⁴¹ In the words of Cook: “Spirits do not rise from the dead in ancient Judaism, people do” (*Empty Tomb*, 496).

may be happy in anticipation of the day of resurrection, now that God has already supplied the deliverance of the people. I say that this is less likely, because Jubilees otherwise contains no attestation of resurrection belief.⁴²

If the open-referent/open-source view produced expectations that were historically appropriate, including that modality would need to be specified if an author wished to explicitly declare a bodily or spiritual resurrection expectation, one might expect more and clearer examples of spirits or souls, as opposed to bodies, being the objects or subjects of resurrection action. Yet the texts that have been examined in this last category, the category that would seem to be most amenable to the open-referent/open-source view, have either not referred to resurrection of spirits or actually pointed in the opposite direction when considered in literary, linguistic, and theological/philosophical context. Other texts are cited on occasion in favor of spiritual resurrection, such as Psalms of Solomon 3:10–12, but they are so cited because of their supposed ambiguity about modality.⁴³ But as has been shown already, it is only the faulty expectation of the open-referent/open-source view that the expression of such would require specification or disambiguation to be bodily. Rather, the expectations of meaning created by resurrection language and the contexts in which it operates are that resurrection will be bodily or metaphorically derived from the source domain of bodily resurrection, unless one were to specify otherwise in a manner that departs from the conventional usage of the language (as the Gnostics did).

IV. APPLICATION TO DANIEL 12 AND 1 CORINTHIANS 15

1. *Daniel 12.* How, then, do these insights apply to the major resurrection texts of Daniel 12 and 1 Corinthians 15? In the first case, one must attend to the verbs used to convey resurrection. In verse 2 Daniel uses the *hiphil* imperfect יקיצו. As indicated already, the verb קץ typically has the sense of “awaken,” which makes it an appropriate counterpart to the previous state of the subjects who were sleeping (ישן). It attains its sense of referring to resurrection from a context that associates sleep with death, and indeed references to “dust” and “sleep” were often euphemisms or metonyms for death (Gen 3:19; 2 Kgs 4:31; 13:21; Job 3:13; 7:21; 10:9; 14:12; 21:26; 34:15; Pss 13:3; 22:15; 76:6; 90:5; 104:29; Eccl 3:20; 12:7; Isa 26:19; Jer 51:39, 57; Nah 3:18).⁴⁴ Theodotion properly translates this with the verb ἐξεγείρω while the LXX/OG uses ἀνίστημι, which overlaps with the former in the sense of “arising,” but it does not have the sense of “waking up” that the former has. The LXX/OG translation would be more appropriate if the verb were קום or עמד, as in verse 13.

The particular *hiphil* form tends to give the verb a causative meaning. According to GKC, in this case, the verb is “inwardly transitive” in the *hiphil* as a verb that

⁴² Also see Cook, *Empty Tomb*, 494–96; Wright, *Resurrection*, 143–44.

⁴³ Finney, *Resurrection*, 54; Lehtipuu, “Biblical Body Language,” 159.

⁴⁴ For more on use of such verbs in resurrection contexts, see Sawyer, “Hebrew Words,” 223–24.

expresses, “entering into a certain condition and, further, the being in the same.”⁴⁵ Likewise, Bill T. Arnold and John H. Choi describe this type of *hiphil* as designating “intransitive causation,” and, “entry into a state or condition and the continuation of the state or condition.”⁴⁶ Such an understanding fits this context; while one can assume that God is the one who awakens the dead, this idea is nowhere grammaticalized in this text. Grammatically, the focus is on those who awaken, not on the agent who acts on a recipient. One should likewise understand the Greek translations of Θ and the LXX/OG (ἐξεγερθήσονται and ἀναστήσονται respectively) as intransitives (as is also the case with the Vulgate translation of *evigilabunt*). This point simply reinforces the continuity of the subject in action from sleeping in the dust to awakening to eschatological judgment. This verse also draws from Isaiah 26:19 with its resurrection language combined with reference to the dust, though there it refers to those who “dwell” rather than “sleep” in the dust.

The other verb for resurrection in Daniel 12 is the common verb עמד in verse 13, here in its simple *qal* imperfect form of תעמד. The only other biblical example to use this verb in relation to resurrection is Ezekiel 37:10, but there it also follows a verb for coming to life.⁴⁷ Here, the context of the reference to the “end of days,” to Daniel’s rest (cf. Prov 21:16; Job 3:11–13, 17; Isa 57:2), to Daniel’s own “end” (קץ)—presumably in the sense of death (cf. 11:45; Ps 39:4; Jer 51:13; Lam 4:18)—as well as the larger context of the chapter (the first verb in verse 1 is also עמד) are what lend this typical verb its rare sense of resurrection. The same applies to the use of ἀναστήσις in both Θ and the LXX/OG, though this term was more frequently associated with resurrection than its Hebrew counterpart.⁴⁸ As in the vividly corporeal presentation of Ezekiel 37, the imagery here is also corporeal.

In the absence of disambiguation that would clarify that these examples of resurrection language apply to something other than the body, we thus have reasons—in line with the expectations of the body-referent/body-source view—to think that this text refers to bodily resurrection. John Collins insists that one cannot take for granted that the resurrection here is bodily or that the scene is on earth.⁴⁹ But the expectations formed by the conventional uses of resurrection language elsewhere work against this claimed ambiguity. In the text itself, the contrasting imagery of sleep—referring to the repose of the body in the ground—and awakening implies that the body is involved in the latter as in the former.⁵⁰ Furthermore, given the earthly setting of the scene prior to this text and the lack of a clear scene change, one must wonder why Daniel would not lead the reader to infer that the scene was on earth and involving embodied life.

⁴⁵ GKC §53d and e. Cf. Bruce K. Waltke and M. O’Connor, *An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 439.

⁴⁶ Bill T. Arnold and John H. Choi, *A Guide to Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 61.

⁴⁷ For more on use of this verb and קום in resurrection texts, see Sawyer, “Hebrew Words,” 222–23.

⁴⁸ Cook, “Use,” 259–80; Fascher, “Anastasis,” 170–94.

⁴⁹ John J. Collins, *Daniel*, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 392.

⁵⁰ Cf. Elledge, *Resurrection*, 22–23; John Goldingay, *Daniel*, WBC 30 (Dallas: Word, 1989), 307–8.

2. *1 Corinthians 15*. The case of 1 Corinthians 15 is more complicated, as scholars cannot avoid Paul's use of "body" language throughout the chapter, but some argue that the resurrection body is fleshless or made of spirit and so ultimately discontinuous from the body that is buried. While there are other reasons for this claim that I do not have space to address adequately here, it is crucial to address at least the first regularly cited point in light of earlier portions of this study.⁵¹ Namely, some claim that such an idea is consistent with Paul's theology of resurrection because he makes no reference to Jesus's empty tomb, either because he does not know or does not care about the stories of Jesus's empty tomb, and thus, as far as Paul is concerned, Jesus's buried body is irrelevant to his risen body.⁵² Since Jesus is the pattern, prototype, and precedent for the resurrection of believers in Paul's larger argument—and thus Jesus's resurrection is assumed as the context for what he says about believers' resurrection bodies—this point is arguably the most crucial consideration for interpreting how Paul conveys his resurrection belief.

Per the previous parts of this study, this claim about Paul amounts to ignoring the implications of the verbal idea already noted for ἐγείρω in relation to the sleep of death (vv. 4, 12–17, 20, 29, 32, 35, 42–44, 52; cf. 6:14), as well as the noun ἀνάστασις used for the eschatological event of resurrection (vv. 12–13, 21, 42). When such resurrection language is used in the setting of conventional discourse, an empty tomb did not need to be—even if it could be—referenced for it to be understood as an implication of the language. That is the conclusion of the cited studies of Cook and Ware. It also makes more secure the frequent argument that the sequence of verbs in verses 3–4 implies a continuous subject and continuous presence of Jesus's body in the actions described (Tertullian, *Res.* 48; *Marv.* 5.9;

⁵¹ Other reasons typically cited are Paul's reference to a "spiritual body" (as it is often translated) in verse 44 and his statement in verse 50 that "flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of God." In addition to those sources I have already referenced, see Andrew W. Pitts, "Paul's Concept of the Resurrection Body in 1 Corinthians 15:35–58," in *Paul and Gnosis*, ed. Stanley E. Porter and David Yoon, PAST 9 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 44–58; K. R. Harriman, "On the Terminological Issue of Describing Resurrection as 'Physical,'" *ErQ* 93.2 (2022): 162–69; James P. Ware, "Paul's Understanding of the Resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15:36–54," *JBL* 133.4 (2014): 809–35.

⁵² In addition to commentaries, see Marcus J. Borg, "The Truth of Easter," in *The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 130; Peter Carnley, *Resurrection in Retrospect: A Critical Examination of the Theology of N. T. Wright* (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2019), 116–36; Richard Carrier, "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb," in *The Empty Tomb: Jesus beyond the Grave*, ed. Robert M. Price and Jeffrey Lay Lowder (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), 105–219; Chilton, *Resurrection Logic*, 3, 71; Adela Yarbro Collins, "The Empty Tomb in the Gospel according to Mark," in *Hermes and Athena: Biblical Exegesis and Philosophical Theology*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Thomas P. Flint (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 111–14; Finney, *Resurrection*, 104–7, 115–16; Hans Grass, *Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), 146–48; Joost Holleman, *Resurrection and Parousia: A Traditio-Historical Study of Paul's Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15*, NovTSup 84 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 142–44; Peter Lampe, "Paul's Conception of a Spiritual Body," in *Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments*, ed. Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 112–14; James M. Robinson, "Jesus—from Easter to Valentinus (or to the Apostles' Creed)," *JBL* 101.1 (1982): 10–13; Smith, *Revisiting*, 27–45; Nikolaus Walter, "Leibliche Auferstehung? Zur Frage der Hellenisierung der Auferwekungshoffnung bei Paulus," in *Paulus, Apostel Jesu Christi: Festschrift für Günter Klein zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Michael Trowitzsch (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 113–14.

John Chrysostom, *Hom. 1 Cor.* 38.4; Cyril of Alexandria, *Comm. 1 Cor.* 15:3–4; cf. Irenaeus, *Haer.* 2.29.2; 3.18.7, 23.7–8; 5.1.3, 13.4; *Epid.* 31; Athanasius, *Inc.* 10; 21; 24; 29; Epiphanius, *Pan.* 64.64–65; 67.6).⁵³

Another support of this argument is that the lack of explicit reference to the empty tomb cannot be counted as a point in favor of such interpretations, because the gospel summaries in Acts never explicitly reference the empty tomb (2:24–36; 3:15–21; 4:10–12; 5:30; 10:40–42; 13:30–37; 17:3, 31–32; 23:6; 24:21; 26:6–8, 23), despite the clear reference in Luke 24:1–12 and 22–24. This absence is also consistent with all summaries of the gospel and confessional formulae elsewhere in Paul (Rom 1:3–4; 5:6–11; 8:18–24; 10:5–10; Eph 1:20–23; 2:4–8; Phil 2:5–11; Col 1:15–20), in non-Pauline texts in the NT (1 Pet 1:3–5, 18–21; 3:18–22; 1 John 1:1–5; 3:1–3; 5:6–12; Rev 1:4–6; 5:9–10), and in subsequent creeds.⁵⁴ In fact, reference to the empty tomb appears only in proper narratives of Gospel accounts (whether canonical or noncanonical).

Furthermore, one must remember that verses 3–7 are only a summary that assume a larger narrative, indeed a larger series of narratives surrounding the appearances in general. The reference to Jesus rising on the third day also assumes a larger narrative. Elsewhere in the NT, the “third day” applies to the emptying of the tomb and, perhaps secondarily, to appearances (Matt 12:40; 27:63–64; Luke 24:7, 21–23; implicitly Acts 10:40), whereas verses 5–7 explicitly reference only appearances.⁵⁵ This is thus another means by which the tradition implies the empty tomb through this abbreviated narrative reference.

Even if this last point about summarizing is not granted, it must be noted that the statements of this argument against Paul’s belief in or knowledge of Jesus’s empty tomb tend to rely on undue speculation about the extent of Paul’s knowledge or concern. One cannot assume, as in the overconfident statements of many scholars, that Paul “knows nothing” of the empty tomb.⁵⁶ It is difficult enough to determine what Paul “knew” from an absence of evidence, but it is even more difficult to determine what Paul “did not know” from that same absence. In the words of Murray J. Harris, “We should not imagine that we can convert our ignorance of the extent of Paul’s knowledge into a knowledge of the extent of his

⁵³ In addition to commentaries, see Christopher Bryan, *The Resurrection of the Messiah* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 50–51; Martin Hengel, “Das Begräbnis Jesu bei Paulus und die leibliche Auferstehung aus dem Grabe,” in *Auferstehung—Resurrection: The Fourth Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium. Resurrection, Transfiguration, and Exaltation in Old Testament, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity*, ed. Friedrich Avemarie and Hermann Lichtenberger, WUNT 2/135 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 129–35; Michael R. Licona, *The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity; Nottingham: Apollos, 2010), 333–39; Ronald J. Sider, “St. Paul’s Understanding of the Nature and Significance of Resurrection in I Corinthians XV 1–19,” *NorT* 19.2 (1977): 136–39; Joseph J. Smith, “Resurrection Faith Today,” *Landas* 20 (2006): 159–61; Jacob Thiessen, *Die Auferstehung Jesu in der Kontroverse: Hermeneutisch-exegetische und theologische Überlegungen* (Zürich: LIT, 2009), 94–95; Wright, *Resurrection*, 321.

⁵⁴ Ware, “Resurrection,” 480–82.

⁵⁵ For more on this point, see Karl Olav Sandnes and Jan-Olav Henriksen, *Resurrection: Texts and Interpretation, Experience and Theology* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2020), 99–100, 105–7.

⁵⁶ See sources in note 52.

ignorance.”⁵⁷ If the Corinthians did not happen to have problems in observing the Lord’s Supper, we would never have direct evidence that Paul knew of the Lord’s Supper or of the story surrounding it. If the Corinthians did not happen to have some among them who denied the resurrection of the dead, Paul would have had no occasion for referring to the foundational tradition he passed on to them, and thus we would never have direct evidence that Paul knew of resurrection appearances to others (though such might still be implied with less clarity by 1 Corinthians 9:1). Without the need to address these issues, Paul still would have known these things, but we who are reading Paul long after his death would not have direct evidence that he knew them. If we had no other basis on which to proceed, the lack of reference to the empty tomb could just as likely be an indication that the Corinthians had no objection to the idea that Jesus’s tomb was empty as it could be an indication that neither Paul nor the Corinthians thought that Jesus’s resurrection implied an empty tomb. But in fact, as argued to this point, we do have other bases for thinking that Paul was neither ignorant nor apathetic about the claim of the empty tomb. And given how such language for resurrection was used more broadly among the Greeks, it is safe to infer that the Corinthians would have likewise assumed that Jesus’s resurrection implied an empty tomb.⁵⁸

One final point in favor of this shared assumption concerns, again, the key vocabulary. Whether it is קִיץ or קוּם in Hebrew, or ἐγείρω or ἀνίστημι in Greek, it is noteworthy that there is not a terminological distinction between these actions of/on the dead in temporary resurrections and the eschatological resurrection.⁵⁹ Stories of raising miracles using this terminology are linked with Elijah (1 Kgs 17:22), Elisha (2 Kgs 4:31; 13:21), Jesus (Matt 9:25 // Mark 5:41–42 // Luke 8:54–55; Matt 11:5 // Luke 7:22; Luke 7:14; John 11:23; 12:1, 9, 17; cf. Matt 10:8; Luke 16:31), and Peter (Acts 9:40–41). In none of these cases did the resurrection language imply that the dead body was unaffected. Rather, this observation further confirms that conventional discourse involved the assumption that resurrection involved the body unless specified otherwise.

CONCLUSION

Between the scholarly views of the possibilities of resurrection language, both biblical texts and nonbiblical Second Temple Jewish texts comport with the expectations of the body-referent/body-source view of resurrection language, rather than the open-referent/open-source view. The open-referent/open-source view extends

⁵⁷ Murray J. Harris, *Raised Immortal: Resurrection and Immortality in the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 41.

⁵⁸ In addition to what I have cited already, though I disagree with Dag Øistein Endsjø’s interpretation of Paul, his research on Greek resurrection belief and immortal bodies in Greek mythology is noteworthy and further supports this point. See Dag Øistein Endsjø, *Greek Resurrection Beliefs and the Success of Christianity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 22–99; Endsjø, “Immortal Bodies, before Christ: Bodily Continuity in Ancient Greece and 1 Corinthians,” *JSTNT* 30 (2008): 417–36.

⁵⁹ This is a more helpful distinction than a terminological distinction of “resuscitation” and “resurrection.” For more on that, see Harriman, “Terminological Issue,” 156–59.

from the expectations of present-day readers that are not in line with the expectations with which ancient audiences would approach these declarations in light of the use of resurrection language more broadly. The expectation that a text would somehow need to specify and disambiguate the bodies of the dead as being involved in resurrection does not comport with the language (especially *ἀνίστημι*, *ἐγείρω*, and their equivalents or derivatives) or imagery used in resurrection references and their contexts. Nor does this view comport with the potentially metaphorical uses of resurrection language, including most famously Ezekiel 37, that signify that the metaphorical use derives from a source domain of bodily action. Furthermore, the expectation that, before the Gnostics, resurrection language with an open source could apply to anthropological aspects or substances distinct from the body does not comport with the lack of evidence of clear usage of such terminology in such a fashion or with the several indicators to the contrary from the texts we have. As such, when applied to texts like Daniel 12 and 1 Corinthians 15, the open-referent/open-source resurrection view is hindering and not helpful.

By contrast, the body-referent/body-source resurrection view better accounts for the language used and supplies expectations more consistent with and helpful for interpreting resurrection texts. The expectation that a text would not need to specify and disambiguate resurrection as being bodily, as that would be the conventional assumption based on the language involved, has been borne out by the texts, which in fact rarely explicitly mention a body being resurrected. This view also comports with potentially metaphorical uses of resurrection language, where the metaphors assume a source domain of bodily action (most clearly in Ezekiel 37). Furthermore, the expectation that resurrection language would be applied to embodied persons, not to anthropological aspects or substances distinct from the body, also fits the evidence, even when body language does not explicitly appear.