This paper assumes as a starting point the Erasmian position regarding divorce and remarriage. It proceeds to argue that in 1 Cor 7:10–11 Paul additionally grants to wives only the possibility of initiating divorce but without the possibility of remarriage.
Gordon Fee (NICNT, 2nd ed, pp 326–27) argues that 1 Cor 7:10–11 presents an ideal (“no divorce”) followed by an exception (“but if she does”). If the exception does occur, “what is disallowed is precisely what one finds in the teaching of Jesus: no adultery.” Fitzmyer (AYB, p 294) makes the same point.
Agreeing with Fee thus far, the paper proceeds to counter Fee’s (p 327) notion that the exception clause applies to both the husband and the wife. Sex differentiation is highlighted in two ways in 1 Cor 7:11–12: (a) uniquely as compared to the rest of the chapter, Paul uses distinct (albeit synonymous) terminology when addressing the woman (χωρισθῆναι) as compared to the man (ἀφιέναι); (b) uniquely as compared to the rest of the chapter, Paul addresses the woman first and the man second.
Fee (pp 322, 326) suggests that Paul addresses the women first because they are the ones causing the problem: “eschatalogical women” are divorcing their husbands as a part of their ascetic pursuits. Garland (BECNT, 1st ed, p 281) finds evidence for Fee’s position wanting, but grants that Paul may address the women first because he had heard that a Christian Corinthian wife was divorcing her husband. Ciampa and Rosner (Pillar, p 291) agree with this position. In contrast, the present paper argues that Paul addresses the women first because he is granting the exception clause to them alone. He does so on the basis of universal distinctions between men and women. The thesis of this paper is that because the husband is the head of his wife (1 Cor 7:3), Paul would never apply the exception clause of 1 Cor 7:11 to the husband. To do so would contradict the husband’s responsibility before God for the state of the marriage.
The final section of the paper indicates the sorts of grounds upon which a woman could divorce her husband in accord with 1 Cor 7:10–11 (i.e., without the possibility of remarriage). This conclusion builds upon Ciampa and Rosner’s (p 294 n115) call for an approach to divorce and remarriage that is neither overly lax nor overly restrictive: “It is incumbent upon Christian leaders to provide counsel that takes seriously both God’s commitment to the preservation of marriage wherever possible and his commitment to the protection of the vulnerable.”