Well before its creedal formulation at Nicaea (325), a triadic “rule of faith” was integral to early Christian belief and practice, guiding biblical interpretation and shaping baptismal confession (Bokedal 2015). Yet the notion of the “rule” extended beyond these dimensions; it also referred to the underlying, all-encompassing reality to which they bore witness (Hagglund 1958). Thus, Eric Osborn has drawn particular attention to the relation between the rule and the use of reason among second-century writers, and called for further investigation of this theme: “The link of rule with argument has been established; the closer examination of that argument and its context will prove a rewarding study.” (Osborn 1987)
In this paper, I aim to answer this call, and build upon Osborn’s preliminary sketch by providing a closer look at the epistemological function of the rule of faith within the intellectual framework of Clement of Alexandria. Charting a course, in his context, between Gnostic syncretists and “simple” or fideistic believers, Clement develops a nuanced account of faith in his Stromateis that highlights the need for a sure criterion to ground and test knowledge claims (Strom. 1.1.8). As Aristotle noted, such a “first principle” must be self-evident and indemonstrable–in other words, an object of faith.
I argue that for Clement, the content of such faith is, specifically, the rule of faith–that is, the church’s faith. The rule’s confession of the triune God as revealed in his redemptive economy itself constitutes the proper understanding the “first principle” to be received by faith, on which all further knowledge must be built (8.3), and against which all competing knowledge claims must be tested (2.2.9; 2.4.13-14, 2.5.15).
I begin with a survey of Clement’s account of faith and its deeply interconnected functions as (1) an epistemological first principle that makes knowledge possible; (2) a criterion for evaluating competing knowledge claims; (3) a foundation for advancing toward true knowledge (gnosis), and (4) the “mother” of all virtues.
Second, I connect this general account of faith with the rule of faith in particular, and demonstrate how the rule specifically informs Clement’s approach to intellectual activity across the three traditional branches of philosophy (metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics), through its proper confession of God, the first principle, as creator, logos, and source of virtue formation, as summarized in the programmatic statement of Strom. 4.25. In Clement’s model, sound intellectual efforts in each domain are grounded in, and shaped by, the “simple” faith which is initially imparted through catechesis (2.18.96; 6.11; 6.15) and lays the foundation for steadily advancing to higher knowledge (5.1; 5.4).
The findings remind us that, contrary to popular (and some scholarly) belief, the assumptions of the rule of faith, later formally expressed in the Nicene Creed, reflect much earlier first-order convictions, which not only informed the church’s exegesis, but also served to ground, direct, and delimit the Christian intellectual life from the earliest period of the church’s history.