In the context of retrieving Classical Trinitarian Theology, one of the key questions that must be addressed is whether the psychological analogy is an essential element of Nicene Trinitarianism. In other words, does the Word proceed from the intellect (understanding) and the Spirit from the will (love)? Some of the most prominent heirs of the Nicene tradition, such as Augustine and Aquinas, responded positively. However, several Reformed and Post-Reformation theologians offered a more critical perspective.
My proposal focuses on the Trinitarian theology of Francis Turretin and contends that, unlike Augustine and Aquinas—who integrate the psychological analogy as a key element in their explanations of the imago Dei and the inner life of God—Turretin proposes a more cautious approach to it, placing strict limitations on the analogy. This cautious approach reflects his Reformed priorities, theological method, doctrine of the imago Dei, and commitment to Federal Theology.
In this context, the question I propose to answer is essentially, why does he deviate from his usual sources in the issue of the psychological analogy? To answer this question adequately, one must navigate the nuanced interplay between the Christian tradition and Reformed theology. And, as Willem Van Asselt, Richard Muller, and others in the Utrecht School of Reformed Theology have demonstrated, this implies an attempt to understand the complexity of theological continuity and discontinuity in the post-Reformation tradition. In this sense, I aim to demonstrate that Turretin operates within distinct theological commitments shaped by his Reformed context. Therefore, unlike scholars such as Lewis Ayres, Thomas Joseph White, Gilles Emery, and Dominic Legge, who emphasize the relevance of the psychological analogy for Trinitarian theology, Turretin operates under other suppositions. Then, my contribution lies in examining those suppositions, more specifically, how his exegetical method, skepticism toward speculative theology, the doctrine of the imago Dei, and covenantal framework shape his rejection of the analogy.