This paper is part of a larger work in which I’m responding to Bignon’s book Excusing Sinners and Blaming God. Overall I argue Bignon was unsuccessful in making a case in favor of the compatibility of Calvinist determinism with human moral responsibility. In this paper I specifically address Bignon’s strategy of arguing that God has the authority to determine human choices. Bignon agrees with the general principle that if a person’s choices are the result of their desires and their desires are set or manipulated by someone else, then the person isn’t in control of their choices and therefore can’t be held morally responsible for them. However, Bignon believes there’s one exception to this general principle, namely, that if God is the one who sets the person’s desires then they are in fact responsible for the choices that result from those desires. He claims God is an exception because “God is the legitimate creator and ruler of all human beings….” (p. 197) In this paper I argue that while Bignon’s point might explain why God has the authority to determine human choices, it doesn’t explain why such determination doesn’t remove our moral responsibility.