The Christian church has long appropriated and modified the thoughts of many philosophers, ranging from Socrates to Kant, for elucidating complex theological concepts. Saul Kripke, a recently deceased analytic philosopher, should be added to that vaunted pantheon. In this paper, I argue that Kripke’s analysis of metaphysically necessary but epistemologically contingent identity statements can be pressed into insightful theological service, namely giving us tools for resolving certain difficulties in both the Incarnation and the Trinity. I shall first summarize Kripke’s analysis of metaphysically necessary but epistemologically contingent identity statements in non-technical terms. Second, I shall then apply Kripke’s concepts to Nestorianism, demonstrating that while making a sharp divide between the purely human Jesus and the fully divine Logos makes initial sense, it is incorrect. Although the concept of divinity and the concept of humanity are so wildly divergent that it seems impossible for one object to fulfill both, Kripke offers multiple real-world examples that prevent such an accidental separation. Third, I shall then apply Kripke’s concepts to Rahner’s Rule, rebutting the common concern that the Rule collapses the economic and the immanent Trinities into one, the opposite problem to Nestorianism. Once again, Kripke’s real-world examples prevent an accidental collapse between concepts just because both apply to one and the same object. I conclude with suggestions and cautions with further application.